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The Commander In Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) participated as a 
performance planning and reporting pilot project (PPRP) in support of the short-term 
requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). Combatant 
military organizations have experienced, and will experience, some of the greatest challenges 
of changing from the management of inputs and outputs to defining, quantifying, measuring 
and managing for outcomes. The central core of this thesis is an exploration of how 
CINCLANTFLT and its action agent the George Washington Battle Group (GWBG) 
developed a performance plan, performance metrics for a carrier battle group (CVBG) and 
a performance measurement system that supported the process of performance management. 
To support the process of performance management the Battle Group Mission Capability 
Reporting System (BGMCRS) was created. The BGMCRS is an automated management 
information system that assists the Battle Group Commander in assessing the projected 
output capability of his command in seven critical mission areas. The system provided 
micro-level and macro-level performance information for use by the Battle Group 
Commander and his staff, and provided CINCLANTFL T with an archived data base that 
documented the performance of operationally deployed CVBG. Through its participation 
as a PPRP, CINCLANTFLT and the GWBG demonstrated that the performance of a CVBG 
is quantitatively measurable while demonstrating the process of performance management 
can assist in the effective and efficient management of a combatant force. 
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The purpose of this thesis will be to explore the process the Commander in 
Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) used to accomplish a pilot project in 
performance planning and reporting. CINCLANTFL T volunteered to participate in 
the pilot project in performance planning and reporting as part of the requirements of 
the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). CINCLANTFLT 
was selected for study because it is one of only two operational combatant commands 
within the Department ofDefense (DoD) involved in the pilot project process and the 
only Department of the Navy (DoN) organization involved. CINCLANTFLT 
accomplished the pilot project utilizing the George Washington Battle Group 
(GWBG) as its test agent. 
America is unquestionably the greatest military superpower in the world. 
Operational units have excelled in producing results. However, short of demonstrat-
ing military superiority in conflict, they have had limited success in measuring and 
quantifying their outputs in terms of efficient and effective outcomes. Military 
combatant organizations have experienced, and will experience, some of the greatest 
challenges of changing from the management of inputs and outputs to defining, 
measuring, quantifying and managing for outcomes. 
It is hoped that this thesis will illuminate the challenges operational commands 
will face, how they may overcome these obstacles and provide them with an example 
of how to accomplish the process of performance measurement. 
B. BACKGROUND 
GPRA is one of several recent legislative initiatives aimed at improving the 
way the Federal government operates. Specifically, the Chief Financial Officers 
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(CFO) Act, the Government Management Reform Act (GMRA) and Vice-President 
Gore's National Performance Review are attempts to refocus federal government 
resource management toward adopting private industry's better business practices. 
Central to each ofthese initiatives is the intent ofbringing accountability, efficiency 
and effectiveness into the management process Federal agencies utilize on a daily 
basis now as well as into their future operation. These initiatives are an attempt to 
cause a cultural paradigm shift in the Federal government from managing inputs and 
outputs to managing for results utilizing performance management practices. 
GPRA is structured to enable a phased implementation process through 
conducting several short-term pilot projects. The intent behind conducting pilot 
projects is to allow for lessons learned from these pilot projects to be used at the 
agency level to enable effective development of strategic plans, performance planning 
and performance reporting. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
A limited review of the history and intent of governmental initiatives related 
to efficient management of federal resources will be conducted. An exploration of the 
how the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller (OUSD(C)) is 
implementing GPRA within the Department of Defense (DoD) will provide a 
transition between the overall requirements ofGPRA and how OUSD (C)'s approach 
to GPRA implementation relates to the performance measurement pilot project 
undertaken by CINCLANTFLT. 
Exploration and documentation of the CINCLANTFLT pilot process will be 
conducted. A historical narrative will be developed for each major phase of their pilot 
project. Performance measurement challenges, solutions and lessons learned will be 
discussed. The future ofCINCLANTFLT's performance measurement process will 
also be explored. 
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D. SCOPE LIMITATIONS 
The core of this thesis will be an exploration of CINCLANTFLT's 
participation in the pilot project provision of GPRA for setting goals, measuring 
program performance against these goals, and reporting on their progress. 
CINCLANTFLT chose a carrier battle group (CVBG) which would be operationally 
deployed overseas while conducting the performance measurement pilot for 
CINCLANTFLT. The chosen CVBG was the GWBG, deployed primarily to the 
Mediterranean from January through July of 1996. This thesis will focus on the 
performance assessment system the GWBG utilized while deployed. 
This thesis did not examine how OUSD(C) is managing implementation of 
GPRA within the DoD. Additionally, the processes utilized by other pilot projects in 
performance measurement are not presented. 
E. THESIS OUTLINE 
The objectives of this thesis are to: 
Examine how CINCLANTFL T developed its performance measure-
ment process. 
Examine how performance measures were developed, captured and 
finalized. 
Explore the strengths and weakness of the CINCLANTFLT perform-
ance measurement process. 
Assess the potential for other combatant commands to utilize the 
CINCLANTFL T process for conducting performance measurement. 
Chapter II provides of a discussion of GPRA. Included is a discussion on the 
short-term and long-term requirements of the Act and how these requirements are 
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interrelated. A discussion concerning the concept of performance measurement will 
be provided to establish the conceptual foundation supporting GPRA implementation. 
Chapter III will be a detailed documentation of the pilot project process 
implemented at CINCLANTFL T. Challenges faced and solutions utilized will be 
provided. Documentation of performance metrics created and the prototype Battle 
Group Mission Capability Reporting System (BGMCRS) will also be discussed. 
Chapter IV will be an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of 
CINCLANTFLT's performance assessment process developed in order to execute its 
performance measurement pilot project. 
Chapter V contains the conclusions reached in this thesis. CINCLANTFL T 
lessons learned from conducting the pilot project and recommendations for further 
study will also be provided. 
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II. GPRA 
With GPRA, Congress and the President have demonstrated a desire for 
agencies of the Federal Government to focus on improving performance. This 
improved performance would in turn either directly, or indirectly, be related to an 
agency's budget. The Act's overriding purpose is first to effect management 
improvement within the Federal government and then to improve the budgeting 
process. 
Predecessors of GPRA whose purposes were to effect bureaucratic change via 
the budgeting process include the Planning-Programming and Budgeting-System 
(PPBS) (although DoD still uses a modified, evolved PPBS); Management-By-
Objectives (MBO); and Zero-Based-Budgeting (ZBB). 
One key difference between GPRA and these former initiatives is their origin. 
Where the previous initiatives were the results of Presidential Directives, GPRA is 
law. Where the life spans of pr~vious initiatives were dependent upon the tenure and 
inclination of a President, GPRA can only be changed through congressional action. 
Where these previous systems were seen to be the road to governmental reform via 
the budgeting process, GPRA is attempting to alter the Federal budgeting process 
after reform of Federal management processes. 
The conceptual framework ofGPRA is premised upon an organization's ability 
to conduct its operations in a businesslike manner. The foundation ofGPRA is rooted 
in directing agencies: to accomplish long-term strategic planning, which defines an 
organization's mission (s) and desired outcomes, to develop annual performance plans 
that will incrementally accomplish the desired goals and outcomes established in the 
strategic plan, to develop a process for measuring achievement of those goals or 
5 
outcomes, and report those results. Table 1 provides a synopsis of what the strategic 
plans, performance plans and performance reports are expected to accomplish. 
Table 1. Tools for the Accomplishment of GPRA 
Strategic Plans Strategic plans are the starting point and basic underpinning 
for program goal-setting and performance measurement. The 
strategic plan articulates the fundamental mission (or 
missions) of an agency and lays out its long-term goals for 
implementing that mission. 
Performance Plans Performance plans are to be the basis on which to measure and 
compare actual performance during a fiscal year against the 
performance goals that were set. 
Performance Reports Program performance reports provide the results ofwha! 
was actually accomplished for the resources that were 
expended. i.e., how well the original goals were met. 
Source: OMB, 1993. 
This chapter will focus on the legislative intent and requirements of GPRA and 
link what is to be accomplished by the short-term pilot projects to the long-term 
requirements imposed by GPRA. The concept of performance measurement will be 
discussed. Valid performance measurement is considered one of the necessary 
precursors for successful GPRA implementation. How the OUSD © has executed 
GPRA implementation will be explored as it relates to efforts of DoD performance 
measurement pilot organizations. The chapter will conclude with an exploration of 
what performance measurement pilots were required to accomplish. 
A. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
What is performance measurement? The Heritage dictionary defines perform-
ance as: "1. The act of performing, or the state ofbeing performed. 2. The act or 
style of performing a work or role before an audience. 3. The way in which someone 
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or something functions." (Heritage Dictionary, 1979, p. 974). Although some would 
argue that the second definition bests illustrates what elected officials do, the third 
definition will be the basis of deliberation in this thesis. In other words, performance 
measurement is the process of measuring how well a person or an organization 
accomplishes their job. 
"Performance measurement is a process by which programs are objectively 
measured on how well they are accomplishing their goals through the effective and 
efficient delivery of products and/or services." (Social Security Administration, 1994, 
p. 1). "Strategic plans provide the foundation for carrying out all other GPRA 
requirements." (Groszyk, 1995, p. 8). If strategic plans are the foundation, then 
performance measurement must be considered the mortar that binds the process of 
strategic planning, performance planning, and performance reporting. 
"GPRA's major elements can be found in most businesses, where these have 
been used fo~ decades but for a different ultimate objective: profit or loss." (Groszyk, 
1995, p. 5). However, where profit is typically the goal of private enterprise, public 
institutions usually do not have such clear objectives. As Figure 1 illustrates, it may 
seem intuitively obvious to most what should be measured. The reason that public 
entities have concentrated primarily on measuring inputs or outputs is because they 
are the easiest to accomplish. Since public sector goals and objectives are not always 
clearly defmed it can be difficult to determine what to measure in terms of outcomes. 
In some cases, such as national defense, the overriding concern has been . 
effectiveness. In war, there are no points for coming in second. The challenge facing 
federal agencies then is to determine what goals they should achieve. This forces 
questions to be asked of stakeholders and hopefully answers to be given. This may 
seem basic to an outside observer but is extremely difficult to accomplish in the 





Figure 1. Performance Measurement Model 
Source: After Lee, 1987, p. 64. 
In GPRA there are no definitions for input or impact measures. "As GPRA is 
directed at establishing performance goals and targets, these defmitions are 
prospective in nature." (OMB, 1995a, p. 1 ). In its "Primer on Performance 
Measurement," the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides defmitions 
for use in executing GPRA. OMB produced its list of pertinent definitions to provide 
a common point of understanding initially for OMB training purposes and later made 






An assessment of the results of a program 
compared to its intended purpose. 
A tabulation, calculation, or recording of activity 
or effort that can be expressed in a quantitative or 
qualitative manner. 
Measures of what an agency or manager has 
available to carry out the program or activity. 
A target level of performance expressed as a 
tangible, measurable objective, against which 
actual performance can be compared, including a 





A particular value or characteristic used to 
measure output or outcome. 
Why the emphasis on performance measurement? GPRA is striving to move 
the Federal management process which is preoccupied with control of resources-
accounting for inputs and outputs and their relation to a line-item budget, to managing 
for results - managing for the effectiveness and efficiency of a program. 
B. LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF GPRA 
In his book "Reframing Organizations" Lee Bolman uses the label of":frames" 
to characterize the different vantage points from which individuals may view an issue 
and "lenses" to describe how individuals may bring such issues into focus. (Bolman, 
1991 ). Interpretations of the intent of GPRA are as numerous as the prospective 
lenses worn by its legislative creators, ultimate implementors and outside observers. 
For example, Walter Groszyk ofOMB states: "GPRA is intended to bring about a 
fundamental transformation in the way government programs and operations are 
managed and administered." (1995, p. 1). However, GPRA is seen by some 
observers within the Federal Government as just the latest "fad" attempt, like ZBB, 
by Congress to demonstrate to the American public that they are governing more 
efficiently and effectively (Leonard, 1995). A case of form over true substance. 
Although GPRA may result in a change to how the Federal Government does 
accomplish the budgeting process, its main objective is to alter the way the Federal 
government accomplishes its job. The stated purposes ofthe Act are to: 
Improve the confidence of the American people in the capability of the 
Federal Government, by systematically holding Federal agencies 
accountable for achieving program results; 
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Initiate program performance reform with a series of pilot projects in 
setting program goals, measuring program performance against those 
goals, and reporting publicly on their progress; 
Improve Federal program effectiveness and public accountability by 
promoting a new focus on results, service quality, and customer 
satisfaction; 
Help Federal managers improve service delivery, by requiring that they 
plan for meeting program objectives and by providing them with 
information about program results and service quality; 
Improve congressional decision making by providing more objective 
information on achieving statutory objectives, and on the relative 
effectiveness and efficiency of Federal programs and spending; and 
Improve internal management of the Federal Government. 
(P.L. 103-62, 1993) 
There is a "corporate" mind set that sees GPRA only as a new way to 
accomplish budgeting. For example, the Air Force's Air Combat Command (ACC) 
views GPRA's potential end result being the creation of a Federal performance 
budgeting system (ACC, 1996). This is the very organizational culture that GPRA 
is attempting to change. "The primary intent of GPRA is to improve the management 
of Federal programs through a results-oriented focus." (JFMIP News, 1995, p. 6). 
GPRA is structured with the understanding that time and experimentation will be 
necessary ingredients needed to evoke this change. The gradual process of moving 
from a system focused on expenditure control - of managing only inputs or outputs 
within the line-item budgeting process; to managing for results, of managing not only 
funds spent, but relating an expenditure to its outcome, is understood to be a daunting 
task. 
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C. LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS OF GPRA 
The legislative requirements ofGPRA can be viewed as having short-term and 
long-term time horizons. The drafters of GPRA hope that accomplishment of the 
short-term requirements will develop the intellectual skills and "business culture" 
necessary for the success of the long-term purposes/requirements ofGPRA. 
1. Long-Term Requirements 
Long-term requirements such as agency strategic plans, performance plans and 
performance reports have indefinite time horizons. These requirements begin in the 
later part of 1997 and continue indefinitely unless the Act is modified or canceled. 
These indefmite requirements direct Federal agencies to: 
Develop Strategic Plans prior to FY 1998 (these plans are to cover 
minimally six years, the first year of the plan and subsequent 5 'out' 
years); 
Prepare Annual Plans setting performance goals beginning with FY 
1999; 
Report annually on actual performance compared to goals. (The first 
Performance Report is due in March 2000). 
OMB is also required to prepare an annual government-wide performance 
plan, which is based on agency annual performance plans. Additionally, strategic 
plans must be updated every three years (P.L. 103-62, 1993). 
Table 2 illustrates the long-term legislative requirements of GPRA. While 
GPRA does not dictate agency preparation of performance budgets, it does create a 
linkage between agency and government-wide performance and their budgets. 
Beginning with fiscal year (FY) 1999, OMB will produce a Federal Government 
performance plan which will be included as a part of the President's budget 
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submission to Congress. (P .L. 103-62, 1993) Every affected agency will also provide 
to OMB, Congress and the President their performance plan that corresponds to the 
fiscal year under budget consideration. Each March, beginning in the year 2000, just 
as Congress begins its budget deliberations, each affected agency will submit their 
performance report covering the previous fiscal year. One can quickly see that 
although there may be no specific dollar amount related to an agency's performance, 
at the macro-level, the President and Congressional decision makers will have greater 
qualitative and quantitative information available during budget deliberations. 
Table 2. Long-Term GPRA Legislative Requirements 
YEAR REQUIREMENTS 
1997 Agencies submit strategic plans. (Updated every three years 
September thereafter). 
September **Agencies submit FY 99 annual performance plans to OMB. 
December **Agencies revise FY 99 annual performance plans to reflect 
Presidential budget decisions. 
1998 **Agencies provide copies of complete final FY 99 annual 
February performance plans to appropriate authorization and appropriation 
committees and make plans available to the public. 
February **OMB submits government-wide performance plan for FY 99 to 
Congress. 
**At agencies' option, revise annual performance plans to reflect 
September FY 99 budget decisions, and provide the revised plans to OMB, 
the appropriate Congressional authorization and appropriation 
committees, and make revised plans available to the public. 
2000 **Agencies submit annual performance reports for FY 99. 
March 
* * Requirement continues indefinitely thereafter for each subsequent FY. 
Sources: P.L. 103-62, 1993 and OMB GPRA Implementation Plan, 1993. 
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2. Short-Term Requirements 
Short-term requirements have a specified time period in which a specific action 
or actions will be accomplished. Examples of this are the pilot projects started in 
1994 and ending in 1997. In the case of the pilot projects, legislative compliance is 
achieved simply through voluntary participation of agencies. There is no penalty for 
failure to participate nor is there penalty or reward for outcomes resulting from 
participation. Having over 70 Federal organizations or agencies volunteer to conduct 
performance measurement pilots may be an indication of a desire within the Federal 
bureaucracy to effect the management changes sought by GPRA. 
Another possible explanation for the large number of volunteers is agencies 
have deemed it politically prudent to show support and enthusiasm for GPRA in the 
hopes of garnering future favor with Congress and the President. (Jones, 1996) This 
view discounts the emerging consensus within Congress to make government work 
better. Passage of the ChiefFinancial Officers Act of 1990, GPRA in 1993, and the 
Government Management Reform Act of 1994 demonstrate the congressional will 
that the Federal Government get more "bang for the buck." Regardless of the 
motivation to participate, for the three years since the passage of GPRA, organiza-
tions have invested vast amounts of energy, time and resources into participating in 
the pilot projects. Table 3 lists the short-term legislative requirements of GPRA. 
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Table 3. Short-Term GPRA Legislative Requirements 
YEAR REQUIREMENTS 
1993 OMB selects at least 10 agencies as pilot projects in performance 
measurement. 
1994 OMB selects at least5 of the performance measurement pilots as pilot 
projects for managerial accountability and flexibility 
1997 OMB selects at least 5 agencies (3 of which must have been 
performance measurement pilots) as pilot projects in performance 
budgeting for 
FY 1998 and 1999. 
1997 By 1 May OMB reports to Congress on pilot results for performance 
measurement and also for managerial accountability and flexibility. An 
assessment on whether the pilot project phase succeeded in providing 
the basis for full-scale government-wide implementation will be 
included. 
1997 By 1 June GAO reports to Congress on implementation of GPRA, 
including the prospects for compliance by Federal agencies beyond 
those participating as pilot projects. 
2001 OMB reports to Congress on results of pilots for performance 
budgeting. 
Sources: P.L. 103-62, 1993 and OMB GPRA Implementation Plan, 1993. 
3. Interrelationship Between Short-Term and Long-Term 
Requirements 
Each short-term pilot process commences four years prior to execution of its 
similar long-term initiative. The pilot process allows a participating agency to 
conduct the "GPRA process" either agency-wide or in a micro-level environment 
using subsets of its organization. The pilot process is the time that an organization 
can stumble, experiment and learn prior to actual GPRA implementation. 
During the time period pilot projects are being conducted, the United States 
General Accounting Office (GAO) and OMB will be conducting assessments as to the 
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success of the pilot projects and the viability of the Federal government to execute the 
long~term requirements of GPRA. GPRA is written such that the only enduring 
requirements are the creation of strategic plans, performance plans and performance 
reports. Although there will be pilot projects in performance budgeting, there is no 
legislative requirement directing government-wide implementation. 
The result is that execution of the pilot projects will result in a "report card" 
on the ability of the Federal government to accomplish either the requirements and/or 
intent of GPRA. OMB's and GAO's assessments occur just prior to execution of 
GPRA long-term requirements. As such, how well performance measurement pilots 
perform will be a key indicator as to whether or not the Federal government is ready 
to accomplish, or capable of accomplishing, the long-term strategic planning, 
performance planning and performance reporting requirements of GPRA. 
D. GPRA PILOT PROJECTS 
GPRA directed that three different types of pilot projects be conducted over 
varied time periods. Those pilot projects and their time periods are: 
Performance Measurement during FY 1994, 1995 and 1996. 
Managerial Accountability and Flexibility during FY 1995 and 1996. 
Performance Budgeting during FY 1998 and 1999. 
1. Performance Measurement Pilot Projects 
Because of the requirements levied by GPRA and OMB for performance 
measurement pilot projects, they have been synonymously referred to as performance 
measurement pilots, performance plan pilots, performance reporting pilots, or as 
performance report pilots. For simplicity and standardization, for the remainder of 
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this thesis they will be referred to as Performance Planning and Reporting Pilots 
(PPRPs). 
Since participation as a PPRP required the creation of relevant portions of an 
agency's strategic plan (i.e., mission statement, agency goals and objectives) if they 
did not already exist and producing an annual performance plan and subsequent 
performance report, many agencies may have volunteered as a way to improve their 
ability to accomplish actual GPRA requirements commencing in 1997. Participation 
as a PPRP gave early participating organizations a three year "head start" in the 
development and execution of actual agency-wide GPRA requirements. A more 
extensive discussion on PPRPs will be conducted later. 
2. Managerial Accountability and Flexibility Pilot Projects 
Although Managerial, Accountability and Flexibility (MAF) pilot projects 
were to be conducted during FY 1995 and 1996, they never occurred. The require-
ments to conduct MAF pilot projects still exist, but OMB has been unable to manage 
their execution. Reasons given to PPRP pilot organizations for the failure to conduct 
MAF pilot projects include the energy and time committed by OMB to oversee the 
PPRPs, assisting agencies to prepare for actual implementation ofGPRA and the need 
for such pilots being considered unnecessary by OMB. OMB supports their decision 
by pointing to legislative measures passed after GPRA and elimination of unnecessary 
and somet!mes self-imposed agency restrictions negating the need for GPRA MAF 
pilot projects. It has also been observed that OMB made the requirements for waivers 
and restrictions so onerous that agencies used Vice-President Gore's National 
Performance Review (NPR) as the vehicle to accomplish the desired changes that 
could have been available through GPRA MAF pilot projects. 
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3. Performance Budgeting Pilot Projects 
It is still too early to comment on the status of Performance Budgeting pilots. 
At this point in time, the process does not begin until late in calendar year (CY) 1997 
although there have been discussions on delaying their execution until CY 1998. 
(Groszyk, 1996). Thus, PPRPs are the only pilot projects that have been 
accomplished. 
E. PURPOSE OF PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT PILOT PROJECTS 
The pilot project plans and reports are intended to test the benefits, 
usefulness, and costs of the performance measurement and goal-setting 
concepts of this Act, and to identify any significant difficulties 
experienced by the agencies during the pilot phase (O!vffi, 1993, p. 32). 
GPRA directed O!vffi to designate at least ten agencies as PPRPs. As stated 
earlier, over 70 Federal organizations were selected to participate. PPRP require-
ments entail having the selected agencies or organizations undertake the preparation 
of relevant portions of their strategic plans, develop performance plans, and produce 
subsequent performance reports. (P.L. 103-62, 1993) GPRA drafters and OMB saw 
the process of participating as a PPRP as an enabling process that would help assist 
in ensuring the overall long-term success of GPRA. While Agencies are preparing 
for eventual implementation of the long-term requirements ofGPRA, they have had 
the opportunity to experiment and learn through the process of conducting their 
PPRPs. The experienced gained will assist agencies in accomplishing the long-term 
requirements of GPRA. 
GPRA also requires the Director of O!vm to submit, no later than 1 May 1997, 
a report to the President and to the Congress which: 
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Assesses the benefits, costs, and usefulness of the plans and reports 
prepared by the pilot agencies in meeting the purposes of GPRA; 
Identifies any significant difficulties experienced by the pilot agencies 
in preparing plans and reports; and 
Sets forth any recommended changes in the requirements of the 
provisions of GPRA. 
· Table 4 shows the implementation and execution schedule for PPRPs. 
Depending on when an organization became a PPRP, it may have had the opportunity 
to produce up to three performance plans and reports. Due to the annual iterative 
nature of GPRA requirements, pilot participants will undoubtedly be further along 
their agency "learning curve" than those organizations that did not participate or did 
not utilize the opportunity to share pilot participant experiences within their whole 
organization. 
Table 4. Performance Planning and Reporting Pilot (PPRP) Project Schedule 
I DUE I REQUIREMENT I 
August 1993 OMB defines list of government functions to be covered by 
pilots. 
August 1993 OMB solicits agency self-nominations. 
October 1993 OMB designates PPRPs. 
March 1994 PPRP organizations submit FY 1994 performance plans to 
OMB. 
March 1994 OMB selects additional PPRPs for FY 1995 and 1996. 
September PPRP organizations submit FY 1995 performance plans to 
1994 OMB. 
March 1995 PPRP organizations submit FY 1994 performance reports to 
OMB. 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
I DUE I REQUIREMENT I 
April1995 PPRP organizations submit FY 1996 performance plans to 
OMB. 
March 1996 PPRP organizations submit FY 1995 performance reports to 
OMB. 
March 1997 PPRP organizations submit FY 1996 performance reports to 
OMB. 
Sources: P.L. 103-62, 1993 and OMB GPRA Implementation Plan, 1993. 
Analysis of requirements listed in Tables 2, 3 and 4 illustrate the systematic 
implementation process established by GPRA. As can be seen from comparing 
requirements in Table 4 to requirements established in Table 2, there is a six month 
period from the completion of an organization's PPRP and issuance of their agency's 
strategic plan and annual performance plan. Also, after submission of the their FY 
1996 performance report (Table 4) there is a period of two months in which o:rvm and 
GAO conclude preparation of their reports to Congress (Table 3). Congress will 
have five months from the issuance of GAO's and O:rvffi's reports in which, if deemed 
necessary, to modify or rescind GPRA prior to the submission of agency strategic 
plans and annual performance plans. 
F. DOD IMPLEMENTATION OF GPRA 
DoD has been managing GPRA implementation at two levels simultaneously: 
the DoD-wide implementation and participation in the performance measurement 
pilot project process. While DoD has been refining PPBS to meet GPRA legal 
requirements, OUSD(C) has primarily acted in a liaison role between DoD 
performance measurement pilot organizations and o:rvm. (OUSD(C), 1995). 
OUSD(C)'s position is that " ... critical elements of GPRA, such as Agency-wide 
strategic plans and increased program accountability, are already part of the DoD 
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PPBS." (OUSD(C), 1995, p. 1). OUSD(C) also states that DoD GPRA corporate 
level objectives are to: 
Integrate GPRA into the PPBS; 
Make GPRA a meaningful Secretary of Defense level report; 
Develop corporate level goals and corporate level performance 
measures. 
OUSD(C) has determined that accomplishment ofGPRA requirements can be 
accomplished at the corporate level with little input necessary from outside the 
Pentagon. OUSD(C) believes that all the information needed to accomplish GPRA 
is already available within the Pentagon through existing information systems and 
there is no need to burden commands with the administrative requirements of GPRA. 
According to several sources, GAO and OMB both believe that OUSD(C)'s 
approach is not in keeping with the intent of GPRA and desire DoD to devolve the 
GPRA process throughout the DoD organization. OUSD(C) stresses, and both OMB 
and GAO agree, that DoD is already accomplishing most, if not all, GPRA require-
ments through PPBS. Several sources state they believe OUSD(C)'s position is "until 
other Federal agencies reach DoD's level ofGPRA compliance further effort is neither 
required nor necessary unless Congress or the President dictate otherwise." 
The impression of several DoD PPRP participants is that OUSD(C) has 
provided little implementation guidance. In fact, during initial coordination meetings, 
the predominate theme expressed by OUSD(C) was that they were there to lend 
assistance when requested and would not dictate the approach an organization could 
or should take in accomplishing their individual performance measurement pilots. 
One source vividly remembers a key OUSD(C) GPRA coordination meeting when 
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an OUSD(C) representative said: "We want a thousand flowers to bloom." Several 
sources point to individuals within OUSD(C) that have been extremely helpful but 
express the opinion that OUSD(C), as an organization, has not" made the cultural 
changes necessary to fully integrate the tenants of GPRA. Because there has been 
little guidance from OUSD(C), the individual services have been unable to provide 
any definitive guidance to their PPRPs. The services have essentially acted as one 
more stop along the road of coordination between DoD PPRPs and OMB. 
In a yet to be distributed GAO report discussing the progress and challenges 
in implementing GPRA at pilot agencies, GAO states: 
Interestingly, we are finding that the pilot agencies making the most 
progress implementing GPRA recognize they still have many problems 
to solve, while those making the least progress tend to see little 
difference between the requirements of GPRA and the way they have 
normally done business. (GAO, 1996, p. 6) 
The merits ofOUSD(C)'s implementation process for GPRA is not the focus 
of this thesis, yet it illuminates a potential institutionally biased philosophical obstacle 
facing DoD pilot participants. DoD PPRP organizations have invested their time and 
energy irrespective of OUSD(C)'s position because they see GPRA helping them 
focus on "doing things right" and "doing the right things." 
Whether OUSD(C)'s approach to GPRA will satisfy Congress or the President 
will be left for others to debate. The overall impression by OMB and GAO is that, 
on the whole, DoD PPRPs have been successful efforts. This should come as no 
surprise since DoD participants are knowledgeable and work within DoD's structured 
PPBS process. Long-term strategic plans, quantitative and/or qualitative assessments 
and evaluating "performance" during the budgeting process are elements of DoD's 
PPBS and bear striking resemblance to the requirements of GPRA. Discarding the 
lack of "corporate" support, DoD PPRPs may have been successful efforts because 
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the ·organizational culture necessary to support GPRA compliance already exists 
within DoD's combatant forces, whose focus has always been results oriented. 
G. SUMMARY 
It is too early to tell whether or not GPRA will succeed within the Federal 
government. It may be determined by Congress, after consultation with both O:MB 
and GAO, that PPRPs have shown merit and the requirements and purpose of GPRA 
can be achieved. GAO and OMB assessments may very well point to the success of 
DoD's PPRPs as the basis to move forward with government-wide implementation of 
GPRA. 
According to GAO, OMB and OUSD(C) sources, the processes utilized by 
several of DoD's PPRP organizations have shown that organizations can go beyond 
simple compliance of the Act while embracing the intent of GPRA - managing for 
results. These organizations have been mentioned as models for other Federal 
agencies to emulate as ways to accomplish the intent and requirements of GPRA. 
One of the organizations that has been mentioned with regular frequency is 
CINCLANTFLT. 
What will be discussed in the next chapter is how CINCLANTFLT, a military 
combatant force which cannot directly measure outcomes in a normal peacetime 
presence operations, accomplished their PPRP and created a performance measure-




In business terms, CINCLANTFLT could be characterized as a $10 billion 
dollar international conglomerate that employs over 140,000 people. 
CINCLANTFL T's operations include airports, harbor facilities, shipping and 
transportation networks, and training facilities. These and other "business areas" exist 
as an extensive industrial complex that supports its major "product lines." The 
common denominator in CINCLANTFL T's "product lines" is providing combat ready 
forces for rotational deployment throughout the world. 
One of these major "product lines" is the CVBG. A CVBG is made up of 
surface combatants, submarines, aircraft, and support ships (McGrady, 1995). 
The most visible and potent force package CINCLANTFLT provides to a 
theater commander is the CVBG. "It is a massive, self sustaining force- over 7,000 
people operating 10 surface and subsurface units and over 70 tactical aircraft - that 
can reposition itself on the high seas at 30 knots, without need for diplomatic 
clearance from other nations, to within striking distance of any adversary." 
(CINCLANTFLT, 1995, p. 5). 
The bottom line for a CVBG can not be measured in terms of monetary profit 
or loss. A CVBG's bottom line is determined by how well a CVBG accomplishes 
such tasks as forward presence, security and crisis response and when necessary, 
fighting and winning in battle. 
There is simply nothing comparable to the flexibility of carriers, with 
their long reach and ability to remain on station for long periods of 
time, which has led to that now-familiar question asked by all national 
command authorities during any crisis: Where are the carriers? 
(George, 1992, p. 103) 
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The focus of this chapter will be a discussion on the evolution and execution 
of CINCLANTFL T's PPRP. The chapter begins with a review of the organization of 
CINCLANTFLT and a typical carrier battle group. Following this is a review of 
CINCLANTFL T's reason for participating as a PPRP and why CINCLANTFLT 
selected a CVBG as its action agent for execution of its PPRP. Next, the challenges 
CINCLANTFL T faced in executing its PPRP will be explored, including the 
development of its performance plan, determining what specific performance to 
measure, and how it developed a system for collecting and presenting the 
performance data. 
Specifically, this chapter will answer the following questions: 
How did CINCLANTFL T create a performance measurement process 
which was useful to its Commander, the CVBG Commander, organiza-
tional members and other stakeholders? 
What was the implementation process used to develop and execute 
CINCLANTFL T's PPRP? 
How were perform~ce measures developed, captured and finalized? 
A. CINCLANTFLT 
1. Organization and Mission 
"The Atlantic Fleet is comprised of all units of the Navy's Atlantic Surface, 
Air, and Submarine Forces, along with various maintenance and support bases, 
stations, and facilities." (CINCLANTFLT, 1995, p. 3). CINCLANTFLT reports 
administratively to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). CINCLANTFL T's 
subordinate commands maintain their administrative link to CINCLANTFL T 
regardless of their geographic location or operational relationship. 
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CINCLANTFL T subordinate commands may report operationally to 
CINCLANTFL T while stateside, but when forward deployed these units report 
operationally to a Unified Commander in Chief (CINC), commonly referred to as a 
"Warfighting CINC." 
CINCLANTFL T's immediate subordinate commands are referred to as Type 
Commanders (TYCOMS). TYCOMS provide the operational forces that 
CINCLANTFL T organizes for employment, usually as a CVBG or as an Amphibious 
Ready Group (ARG). CINCLANTFLT's TYCOMS are Naval Air Forces, Atlantic, 
Naval Submarine Forces, Atlantic and Naval Surface Forces, Atlantic. If 
CINCLANTFLT deploys an ARG, Marine Forces, Atlantic also provides Marine 
personnel and equipment. Due to research constraints, the issue of ARGs was not 
explored and will not be discussed in this thesis. 
CINCLANTFLT's mission is to: "Support Unified and NATO Commanders 
with fully trained and combat ready forces-- executing all tasks-- timely, correctly, 
safely and decisively." (CINCLANTFLT, 1993, p. 3). In other words, 
CINCLANTFL T provides forces ready to fight and win. 
2. TheCVBG 
A CVBG takes on the name of the aircraft carrier which serves as the flagship 
for the Battle Group Commander (BGCDR). Due to deployment timing considera-
tions, the GWBG was chosen to act as CINCLANTFLT's PPRP action agent. 
The 'life' of a CVBG is normally two years, covering eighteen months in the 
United States and 6 months operationally deployed overseas. The notional life cycle 
of a CVBG begins after return from a forward operational deployment. This is 
normally 18 months prior to a CVBG's next deployment. During the first 12 months 
after return from deployment units undergo equipment repair or replacement, 
personnel changes and basic unit training. 
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Six months prior to deployment, designated units from CINCLANTFLT 
TYCOMs come under the operational control of the CVBG Commander. The CVBG 
Commander then reports operationally to the Commander, Second Fleet (C2F) for 
advanced training and evaluation prior to ultimately deploying overseas. C2F is 
CINCLANTFL T's Battle Group trainer, responsible for welding designated individual 
units into a cohesive, combat ready force (CINCLANTFLT, 1995, pp. 3-4). 
A CVBG operational deployment is usually 6 months in duration. During this 
time, the CVBG is regarded as a national military asset, one of the key tools for 
employment by a W arfighting CINC, providing an initial crisis response capability 
anywhere in the world. Upon completion of the forward deployment, the CVBG 
returns to the United States where it begins its next 'life' cycle. 
The operational cost of a CVBG from training work-ups ($141M) to return 
from deployment ($133M) is approximately $274 million (CINCLANTFLT, 1994). 
With the military hearing the legislative charge to do more with less, CINCLANTFL T 
finds itself developing the tools necessary to ensure it is effectively and efficiently 
utilizing its resources in accomplishing its mission. 
B. PURPOSE OF PARTICIPATING AS A PPRP 
CINCLANTFL T felt that there were three predominant advantages from 
participating as a GPRA PPRP. 
First, it provides the opportunity to assess and improve the current 
linkages between our headquarters level strategic plan, Battle Group 
execution of the Navy Department's CVBG mission critical tasks, and 
the warfare requirements decision process. Second, as 'Stewards of the 
Public Trust' we need to continually focus on improving the Navy's 
collective effort to better husband its resources - people, equipment and 
funds. Lastly, participation offers a front-end lessons learned 
opportunity on how to adapt our corporate processes to best fit the 
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performance funding objectives of GPRA. (CINCLANTFL T, 1995, 
pp. 1-2). 
The above statement provides some insight into CINCLANTFLT. First, 
CINCLANTFL T was improving its process for communicating corporate goals to 
every level of the organization and encouraging leadership/management efforts 
throughout the command to accomplish these goals. Second, CINCLANTFL T saw 
the need, and was taking action, to provide greater linkage between day-to-day 
operations and efforts to accomplish its goals and mission. Third, CINCLANTFL T 
anticipated that GPRA would eventually influence the way it would manage its day-
to-day operations. 
CINCLANTFLT had an existing strategic plan, it had specified goals and 
objectives, and was developing benchmarks in order assess its organizational success. 
What it didn't have was a viable measurement process that assisted its subordinate 
commands in assessing how they were doing in accomplishing their jobs. Hence, 
CINCLANTFL Twas unable to adequately measure how well it was accomplishing 
its corporate goals or mission. CINCLANTFL T saw GPRA as a way to help focus 
its efforts in effectively managing its operations. CINCLANTFL T saw participation 
as a PPRP as a way of accomplishing one of its established goals, to "develop 
accurate and timely measurement to better assess readiness of forces." 
(CINCLANTFLT, 1995, p. 17). 
C. . SELECTION OF A CVBG AS PPRP ACTION AGENT 
Why select a CVBG, an entity with so many variables affecting its ability to 
accomplish its mission, many of which are outside the control of either the CVBG 
Commander or CINCLANTFL T? The question DoD and OUSD(C) wanted 
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CINCLANTFL T to answer was whether or not it is possible to measure the 
performance of one of its combatant units. 
If CINCLANTFL T could not adequately measure the performance outcome 
of one of its major "product lines," then its ability to manage its resources effectively 
and efficiently could be categorized as questionable. CINCLANTFL T saw the need 
for a CVBG performance measurement process as more than just producing a credible 
PPRP; the need for improved performance measurement and management for a 
CVBG was seen as a precursor to developing a CINCLANTFLT -wide performance 
management process. 
D. PPRP IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES 
Six major challenges faced CINCLANTFLT at the onset of its PPRP: (1) 
Selecting the appropriate GPRA coordinator; (2) Coping with time constraints; (3) 
Accepting PPRP control limitations; (4) Determining performance outcomes; (5) 
Determining CVBG performance indicators; and (6) Securing action agent support. 
Each of these will be discussed below. 
1. Selecting the Appropriate GPRA Coordinator 
The original directorates that coordinated the submission ofCINCLANTFLT's 
nomination package were the CINCLANTFL T Inspector General's and Comptroller's 
offices. Upon CINCLANTFLT's selection as a PPRP they felt that, because of their 
lack of CVBG operational experience, they would be the wrong selection as 
CINCLANTFLT's PPRP coordinator. One ofthe key individuals that helped initiate 
CINCLANTFL T's participation as a PPRP was the Deputy Comptroller, 
·CINCLANTFL T, Mr. Greg Franceski. Although Mr. Franceski is a strong supporter 
of the concepts ofGPRA, he also realized that he lacked the operational knowledge 
and the necessary credibility with operational forces to accomplish a credible PPRP 
involving a CVBG because he was "just an accountant." He understood that a 
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successful PPRP would need to be accomplished by personnel knowledgeable in the 
actual operation of a CVBG - process owners that understood how a CVBG operates. 
Mr. Franceski believes that GPRA was a management initiative that could be 
subsequently supported by an accounting system (Personal interview, 1996). 
What the PPRP needed was a group of talented experts, personnel knowledge-
able in the operation of a combatant force to drive CINCLANTFLT's PPRP. This led 
to CINCLANTFL T's Warfare Programs and Readiness Directorate (N8) assuming the 
lead for executing the PPRP. 
N8 is headed by Dr. Roger Whiteway, a Naval Reserve Captain and Naval 
Aviator who is an expert not only on naval operations but a driving force in the way 
CINCLANTFL T conducts its core operations. N8's primary PPRP action officer is 
Mr. Dick Pearsall, a retired Navy Captain, who has extensive experience with the 
operation of naval forces. Mr. Pearsall has been a Destroyer Commanding Officer 
and twice the Commander of a Destroyer Squadron. Another expert who worked on 
the PPRP is Mr. Ted Hill. Mr. Hill was assigned the primary responsibility for 
development of the software to support the CINCLANTFLT PPRP. Mr. Hill is a 
retired Navy Captain with extensive experience in Naval Aviation, a former Aircraft 
Squadron Commander, Ship Commanding Officer and a CVBG Chief of Staff. This 
group of experts in the operation of a CVBG, developed CINCLANTFL T's PPRP 
implementation process and performance measurement conceptual framework. 
2. Coping with Time Constraints 
N8 took charge of the PPRP in late February of 1995, leaving them little more 
than one month to develop CINCLANTFL T's performance plan. This resulted in an 
obvious "time crunch" for N8 and focused efforts to accomplish the basic require-
ments of a GPRA PPRP. 
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Some PPRP organizations used the PPRP process to begin early 
implementation of GPRA, a much more ambitious undertaking than that assumed by 
N8. N8 accepted the challenge of running the CINCLANTFLT PPRP with one 
primary goal: "Answer the GPRA mail." (Pearsall, 1996) N8 saw their task as a 
PPRP consisting of one primary objective, answering the question: Can performance 
of a military combatant force, specifically a CVBG, be measured? 
3. Accepting PPRP Control Limitations 
One challenge that can n~t be understated was the fact that whatever process 
CINCLANTFL T developed would be executed by the deployed CVBG Staff. "Once 
the CVBG Commander 'chops' to the operational control of the Theater CINC, 
CINCLANTFLT will effectively have no control over any of the variables that may 
impact on the execution of this pilot plan nor little leverage to assist the CVBG 
Commander." (CINCLANTFLT, 1995, p. 16) This constraint manifested itself in the 
planning process as a performance plan manageable enough not to impact the 
GWBG's day-to-day ability to support the Warfighting CINCs while conducting the 
PPRP. One of CINCLANTFLT's PPRP development guidelines was to keep the 
PPRP simple and manageable. The time constraint also resulted in the assessment 
process remaining flexible by supporting the needs of the GWBG Commander first, 
while providing aggregate performance information to CINCLANTFL T. 
4. Determining Performance Outcome 
Unlike other Federal agencies, a combatant force cannot be operated 
nor its performance measured solely by the application of proven 
business practices. GPRA calls for 'outcome measures' to be developed 
and incorporated into the performance plan. For a DoD combatant 
force, outcome measures are best calculated during armed conflict - a 
situation counter to our peacetime deterrence mission. 
(CINCLANTFLT, 1995, p. 15) 
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Simply stated, a combatant organization such as a CVBG does not have the 
ability to measure its primary outcome, success in battle, unless it executes a military 
operation. The compromise that CINCLANTFL T N8 proposed, which was accepted 
by OMB, was to use the concept of "projected output capability" instead of an 
absolute outcome measure. Projected output capability is similar to the military 
concept of readiness - the ability of a military unit to accomplish an assigned 
operational task. The outcome that CINCLANTFL T would attempt to measure then 
was the ability of the GWBG to be ready to accomplish any task assigned by a 
W arfighting CINC. 
5. Determining CVBG Indicators of Performance 
What is the projected output capability of a CVBG? Initially determining what 
to measure was a sticking point as CINCLANTFL T began to develop it performance 
plan. Members of the CINCLANTFLT staff had their own intuitive beliefs about 
what it took for a CVBG to be "successful" but none of these metrics or measures 
were codified in one, all encompassing, structure. Fortunately, the problem of 
determining what to measure was solved by the issuance of OPNA V Instruction 
3501.316 in February of 1995. (OPNAV Instruction 3501) OPNAV Instruction 3501 
defined the critical tasks that a CVBG should be minimally capable of accomplishing 
as a principle element of the national power projection capability. The thirteen 
critical tasks a CVBG should be able to accomplish are: 
1. Surveillance and Intelligence 
2. Command and Control 
3. Air Superiority 
4. Maritime Superiority 
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--------------------, 
5. Power Projection 
6. Theater Ballistic Missile Defense 
7. Operations in Support of the Peacetime Presence Mission 
8. Amphibious Force Operations 
9. Insertion and Withdrawal of Land-Based Forces into Uncertain or 
Hostile Environments 
10. Special Operations 
11. Combat Search and Rescue 
12. Mine Warfare 
13. Sustainment 
(CINCLANTFLT, 1995, p. A-1) 
The requirements for each task establish what a CVBG should be able to 
accomplish. What the instruction does not provide is a list of the variables that should 
be accounted for in accomplishing a given task. OPNAV Instruction 3501lists what 
must be accomplished but not how the task is to be accomplished. The "how" is left 
to the discretion, skill and ability of the combatant commander(s) to determine. 
Ability to accomplish the listed critical tasks in essence becomes the mission 
of a CVBG. CINCLANTFLT needed to determine the specific measures and 
performance indicators, that provided an assessment of a CVBG's ability to 
accomplish each task. How CINCLANTFL T and the GWBG determined specific 
performance indicators for each critical task will be discussed later. 
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6. Securing Action Agent Support 
CINCLANTFLT could have just ordered the Commander,, GWBG, Rear 
Admiral Giffin, to conduct the PPRP. As a military professional, he would have 
saluted smartly and executed the order. This would have ensured compliance but not 
necessarily cooperation or support for the PPRP. 
N8 approached Rear Admiral Giffin explaining the legislative requirements of 
GPRA, stressing that CINCLANTFLT was accomplishing an O:MB/DoD tasking and 
their desire to create a CVBG performance assessment system. He was supportive of 
the concept of producing a performance measurement process for a CVBG, yet was 
concerned about the PPRP being a potential impediment to his primary day-to-day 
mission of tactical support to the GWBG's Warfighting CINC(s). 
In response to his concerns, N8 worked with him to determine, create, and 
establish the framework for the performance plan, determination of the methodology 
for performance indicator development and creation of a Battle Group Mission 
Capability Reporting System (BGMCRS). 
N8 also established certain precedents to gamer support from both the Battle 
Group Commander and his organizational members. First, there were to be no new 
measures created. This was done to ensure that the Battle Group Staff and supporting 
units would not become overburdened by the data collection effort. The BGMCRS 
would rely on using existing measures to support the BGMCRS performance 
indicators. Second, the performance measurement process would be primarily 
focused on supporting the information needs of the CVBG commander and not 
CINCLANTFLT. Finally, the Commander, GWBG would have ultimate authority 
to modify any elements of the BGMCRS in order to better reflect his needs. 
Another way N8 garnered support among members of the GWBG was to 
involve them in developing the critical task/sub-task performance indicator matrices 
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which became the foundation of the computer software system, the BGMCRS. The 
BGMCRS would provide the BGCDR and his staff with micro-level or macro-level 
performance information while providing macro-level performance information and 
the complete archived data set from the GWBG to CINCLANTFLT. Thus, the goal 
for the GWBG evolved from accomplishing the GPRA PPRP to development, trial 
and validation of the prototype BGMCRS. The BGMCRS was to become 'their' 
system. "Giving people a role in shaping decisions secures their commitment." 
(Kaufman, 1981, p. 82; cited in Behn, 1995, p. 660). 
E. THE NEED FOR THE BGMCRS: AUTOMATING THE 
COMMANDER'S INFORMATION SYSTEM 
Before discussing CINCLANTFLT's PPRP methodology a detour to discuss 
what the prototype BGMCRS provided the BGCDR is necessary. As will be shown 
later, there is no shortage of data being collected within a CVBG. Often this data is 
used ~or management purposes at lower levels within the CVBG and not aggregated 
into an information set that provides a holistic indication of a CVBG's ability to 
accomplish a given critical task. Also, not all of this data or information is presented 
to the BGCDR. It is not a factor of the BGCDR not wanting the information. The 
limitation of what information is provided to the BGCDR is more a function of time, 
technology, the visibility of the staff officer (i.e., how high or low within the 
organizational hierarchy an officer was located) and the lack of an better management 
information system. 
To understand what the BGMCRS would provide the BGCDR, an appreciation . 
. 
of how he presently receives and correlates the available information he uses to assess 
the capabilities ofhis command will be provided. Most of the BGCDR's performance 
information is provided in twice daily staff meetings, typically 9:00am and 7:00pm. 
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The 9:00 forum is called the "Morning Meeting" and is typically the main meeting 
of the day and is attended by the majority of the staff. 
Prior to the Morning Meeting though the BGCDR spends his morning going 
over various reports detailing the status of his forces. This will usually take one to 
two hours each morning. The Morning Meeting is where the BGCDR is briefed on 
the status of the Battle Group by his principle staff officers and organizational 
commanders also embarked aboard the carrier (i.e., Airwing Commander or Carrier 
Commanding Officer). They have distilled many of the same reports that the BGCDR 
has already read, adding any additional information that may reflect differently than 
that reported to either him or outside interested parties (i.e., unit TYCOMS, the 
Warfighting CINC(s) and the National Command Authority). Most of these reports 
are related to individual commands or departments. This is the beginning of the 
"stove-pipes" of data the BGCDR will analyze on a daily basis. 
Each staff officer will usually brief what happened over the last 24 hours, the 
day's planned schedule of events, near term major events, things that are going well, 
areas that are having problems with recommendations for correcting problems, areas 
they feel require his personal attention or problems requiring his direction for 
resolution. At times the briefing can seem endless and the volumes of information 
approaching infinity. The subjects covered are usually complex and dynamic. 
Because each staff officer tries to resolve all possible issues at his level some issues 
can sometimes be slow to surface for the attention of the BGCDR. 
This parade of officers (12 or more), with their supporting data or distilled 
information, presents a portion of the CVBG "picture." The Intelligence Officer will 
discuss intelligence matters, the Operations Officer will discuss operational matters, 
the Logistics Officer will discuss logistics matters, and so forth. Rarely is there an 
overlap or integrated functional assessment of the CVBG's overall capability. This 
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is accomplished by the BGCDR after he has heard and read all the provided 
information. 
All of this information will be presented orally, graphically with overhead 
slides or in written summaries. These Morning Meetings last an average of one to one 
and one-half hours, or longer depending on the complexity of the environment within 
which the Battle Group is operating. 
The Morning Meeting is the BGCDR's primary management information 
system. The BGCDR takes these stove pipes of data, uses his knowledge of CVBG 
operations, at-sea experience, command experience, analytical abilities and intuitive 
skills to make a personal assessment of how his command performed in the past while 
making a subjective assessment of the abilities of his command to operate today and 
in the future. He is a human computer that takes these hundreds, perhaps thousands 
of pieces of data and mentally aggregates it into a functional assessment of his 
command. 
The BGMCRS was an attempt to automate the BGCDR's management 
information system by aggregating, correlating and reporting the status of the CVBG 
by functional mission areas (critical tasks). The BGMCRS would also provide his 
principle staff officers and unit commanders a new management tool which assisted 
them in being able to quantitatively assess their individual areas of responsibility. 
Figure 2 provides an example of the aggregate performance report the BGMCRS 
provided the Commander. What will follow is a discussion of the methodology 
CINCLANTFL T utilized to accomplish its PPRP and how the BGMCRS was 
developed to support CINCLANTFLT's goal of measuring the outcome value(s) of 
a CVBG. A demonstration of the different levels of mission critical task information 
the BGMCRS can provide will also be shown. 
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Battle Group Reporting ~ystem 
Readiness Status as of 08 Jul 96 
Today Average 
G G I Air Superiority B1 (0.93) (1.27) 
G y Maritime Superiority B2 (1.38) (1.37) 
G y Power Projection B1 (0.88) (1.11) 
G y Peacetime Presence B2 (1.01) (1.28) 
G G Sustainment *B1 (0.89) (1.24) 
G y Command & Control B2 (1.16) (1.14) 
G G Surveilance & Intel B1 (0.17) (1.09) 
NOTES 
COLOR CODE • = Indicates buried degrader (subtask below 62) 
G =Green, Y =Yellow, R =Red 
GIG= 61, GN = 62, YN = 63, Y/R = 64, R/R = 65 
Source: After CDR, GWBG, 1996. 
Figure 2. Sample BGMCRS Daily Report 
F. CINCLANTFLT PPRP METHODOLOGY 
Upon initiation of the PPRP process, CINCLANTFL T began a concurrent, 
iterative process of developing its performance plan, creating a performance 
assessment system, and determination of performance goals and eventual performance 
report. The plan to execute their PPRP resulted in CINCLANTFL T developing a 
performance assessment process that fit within their organizational culture, existing 
processes and allowed for paradigm shifts to occur as the PPRP and assessment 
process evolved. Figure 3 provides a visual representation of CINCLANTFLT's 
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Source: After CINCLANTFL T briefing to GAO representatives 26 August, 1996. 
Figure 3. CINCLANTFLT's Performance Assessment Process Model 
performance assessment model. For analysis purposes CINCLANTFL T's perform-
ance assessment model will be broken into four phases: (1) Starting position; (2) 
Determining appropriate performance measures; (3) Creating a data collection and 
array system; and ( 4) Establishing performance goals. 
1. Starting Position 
a. Determining Mission and Critical Tasks 
As stated previously, CINCLANTFLT's organizational mission is to 
provide combat ready forces to the Warfighting CINCS. The mission of a CVBG is 
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to be ready and able to execute any of the CNO established CVBG critical tasks. · 
Given the time constraints and the pilot nature of the tasking, the Initial PPRP plan 
called for only five critical tasks to be measured. Because of the efforts of the 
working group in developing appropriate measures and the effectiveness of the 
BGMCRS during initial testing, Rear Admiral Giffin decided that he wanted to add 
two additional critical tasks for measurement as a part of the PPRP. The seven 
critical tasks selected for measurement during the GWBG's deployment (with their 
corresponding CNO critical task number) were: 
Surveillance and Intelligence (Task 1) 
Command and Control (Task 2) 
Air Superiority (Task 3) 
Maritime Superiority (Task 4) 
Power Projection (Task 5) 
Peacetime Presence Operations (Task 7) 
Sustainment (Task 13) 
b. Assessing Current Readiness Measurement Systems 
Two primary readiness assessment and reporting systems were in 
existence at the onset of CINCLANTIL T' s PPRP. They were the Status ofResources 
and Training System (SORTS) and the Casualty Report (CASREP) system. 
SORTS provides a snapshot of the capability of individual ships, 
submarines or air squadrons to execute their wartime missions. This 
assessment is based on the unit's material condition, personnel 
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manning, supply status, ordnance inventory and training. SORTS 
provides a broad overview of unit status, based on these specific 
indicators. The CASREP system supports the CNO and CJNCS in the 
material management of assigned forces by advising operational and 
support personnel of any degrades in equipment status that might affect 
a unit's ability to perform its missions. (GWBG, 1996, Enclosure 1, p. 
2) 
"SORTS has five grades which result in a unit being rated from C-1, 
most ready; to C-5, least ready." (Junor, 1996, p. 3). The CASREP system also 
includes a corollary C-1 to C-5 rating of the levels of equipment degradation from 
minor to critically important to the unit's ability to operate. "SORTS is subjective and 
often includes the commander's interpretation of the readiness of his unit." (Junor, 
1996, p. 5) The same limitation has often been expressed ofthe CASREP system. 
In the development of the BGMCRS, the potential for personal interpretation of data 
was eliminated by requiring affected units to report only raw data. The BGMCRS 
would contain the metrics and controls for determining ultimate performance 
indicator values. 
CINCLANTFLT utilized the corporate knowledge of SORTS and 
CASREP as the philosophical framework for developing their BGMCRS. The 
CINCLANTFL T assessment process enabled them to modify selected elements of 
both SORTS and CASREP for use in the BGMCRS while expanding the scope of 
total indicators and include those capability elements of typical interest to the 
BGCDR. As CINCLANTFL T put it: "We selected the path of least institutional 
resistance." (CINCLANTFLT, 1995, p. 19) The prototype BGMCRS reflected 
aggregate CVBG capability while eliminating some of the limitations of the unit level 
SORTS and CASREP systems. The result of adapting the conceptual framework of 
SORTS and CASREP, which are primarily reporting systems to higher headquarters, 
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was the BGMCRS, a management tool for the GWBG Commander and his staff. 
Thus, CINCLANTFL T created a realistic and responsive performance reporting 
system that provided macro-level and micro-level information to the GWBG 
Commander and his staff while also providing macro-level information and the 
GWBG's archived data set to CINCLANTFLT. 
2. Determining Appropriate Performance Measures 
The challenge at this point of the performance assessment process was 
determining the sub-tasks and key performance indicators that would provide an 
assessment of the GWBG to accomplish a given critical task. Figure 4 shows how 
CINCLANTFL T organized its data hierarchy to measure the projected outcome 
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Source: From CINCLANTFL T briefing to GAO representatives 26 August, 1996. 
Figure 4. CINCLANTFLT Critical Task Data Hierarchy 
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In business terms, these sub-tasks and performance indicators could be 
characterized as "factors of production." The question N8 wanted the GPRA working 
group to answer was: What are the "factors of production" that result in a CVBG's 
output capability for each critical task? As Figure 5 illustrates, N8's challenge was 
to determine the elements that go into determining projected output capability and 
creating the performance algorithms that would provide them with a value for each 





function( "factors of production") 
Figure 5. Basic Projected Output Capability Performance Algorithm 
a. Determining Subtasks and Performance Indicators 
CINCLANTFL T took the CVBG critical tasks developed in CNO 
Instruction 3501 and had task-specific working groups develop the subtasks and 
initial performance indicators. These experts were drawn from staffs of the GWBG, 
CINCLANTFLT, C2F, the TYCOMS, Tactical Training Group Atlantic, Commander 
Carrier Group Four and the Atlantic Fleet Senior Officer Observer Team (SOOT). 
What is important to understand is not from where these working group members 
came, but to appreciate that thev were former or current unit commanders. line 
managers and process owners who had extensive subject-matter expertise relating to 
at-sea battle group operations. These subject-matter experts possessed the "corporate 
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knowledge" that would be critical to determining the "whats" that comprise the 
projected output capability for each critical task. 
GPRA provides specific defmitions for output and outcome measures 
and stresses the need to measure outcomes instead of inputs or outputs. As stated 
earlier, CINCLANTFL T had been granted approval of its "projected output 
capability" concept in lieu of the use of wartime contingent outcome measures. N8 
felt that although they may be using "simple" input and output measures, the resulting 
projected output capability values from a critical task performance algorithm 
produced the "outcome" value that complied with the intent ofGPRA. 
b. Determining Data Selection 
As each task was analyzed for selection of sub-tasks and performance 
indicators, guidelines were established for determining data selection. This guidance 
included: 
- Limiting the number of performance indicators. 
- Ensuring data was available to Battle Group Staff .. 
- Linking performance indicator metrics to existing standards or policies. 
- Not weighting performance indicators. 
(1) Limiting the Number of Performance Indicators. Just 
as CINCLANTFL T limited the number of critical tasks to measure during the pilot, 
they did not want the GWBG to become overwhelmed in an effort to capture all 
possible variables. As one other DoD PPRP participant stated: "Measure everything 
and you measure nothing." (Trump, 1996) This had to be balanced against the 
philosophy of "You can't manage what you don't measure." (Flanagan, 1996) N8's 
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intent was to have the working group members work smartly at capturing only the 
"vital few" data elements that would result in "intelligent aggregation of data for the 
decision maker." (Pearsall, 1996) This resulted in each sub-task, on average, having 
no more that six to eight performance indicators. 
(2) Ensuring Data Was Available to the Battle Group Staff. 
Participants in the PPRP working groups recognized that there was no shortage of 
data being collected within a CVBG, yet little of it was being collated or integrated 
at the Battle Group level or being reported in a Battle Group holistic perspective. Just 
as each manager conducts some basic measurement ofhis department, N8 wanted to 
ensure that the data collected was something that was already being reported to 
members of the Battle Group Staff, or that a reporting process could be easily created 
to report the data without undue effort by lower elements of the organization. In some 
cases this meant nothing more that adding the GWBG as an information addressee on 
message traffic going to other commands. 
(3) Linking Performance Indicator Metrics to Existing 
Standards or Policies. The third guideline helped the working group ensure that they 
were establishing metric values in line with existing standards or policies whenever 
possible. For instance, the CNO has established goals for tactical aircraft in terms of 
minimum mission capable rates at a given point in the normal operating cycle. The 
working group ensured their metrics aligned with such policies and standards. 
(4) Not Weighting Performance Indicators. The fourth 
guideline was met with some trepidation by members of the working groups. It took 
some effort on the part ofN8 to convince working group members that developing a 
priority ranking or weighting of performance indicators was beyond the time, 
technology and resources available particularly given the prototype nature of the 
PPRP tasking. One can quickly get into a "Which came first, the chicken or the egg?" 
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philosophical discussion. What is more important, the fighter pilot, the aircraft, or the 
command and control structure that supports him or her in accomplishing a given 
tactical mission? The answer is all of the above. Elements such as these are 
commonly referred to a "show stoppers." "Many of the indicators represent a set of 
minimum conditions required to do a task." (CINCLANTFL T, 1996, p. A-2) 
This issue was resolved by the BGMCRS annotating if a 
critical task had a buried degrader (value below B-2) in the critical task performance 
report display. This resulted in the Battle Group Staff of BGCDR having an 
automatic indication of a buried degrader while not getting bogged down in a time 
consuming exercise of determining relative weights among aggregated "show 
stoppers." 
c. Establishing Performance Metrics and Controls 
BGMCRS-ratings (B-ratings) for each task and sub-task were initially 
established and refined by the GPRA working groups before final approval by the 
GWBG Commander and Director ofN8. The B-rating scale intentionally follows the 
concept of SORTS/CASREP ratings. The rating scale followed the following 
framework: 
B-1 Fully Capable of doing ~ntire task or subtask. 
B-2 Minor degradation to overall capability. 
B-3 Major degradation to part of capability or multiple minor degradations. 
B-4 Marginal ability to do full task. 
B-5 Unable to do task. 
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CINCLANTFLT provided the following caveat to the B-rating system: 
"The capability to carry out a task or mission, however, also depends on additional 
factors which are difficult to quantify. The factors may include specific character-
istics of the threat and/or threat location, battle group force structure and capabilities, 
environmental factors, Rules of Engagement in effect, other tasking(s) assigned to 
battle group assets, and reliance on specific supporting assets from national or theater 
sources. In other words, performance indicators are just that - "indicators." 
(CINCLANTFLT, 1995, p. A-2) 
The ultimate B-rating would thus be determined by the GWBG 
Commander. "Our BGMCRS will mirror SORTS and allow the CVBG Commander 
to apply his subjective judgment in deciding to what degree the quantitative metric 
degradation impacts a mission area." (CINCLANTFLT, 1995, p. 20). For instance, 
if the carrier were short on a given type of ordnance then that sub-task B-rating would 
reflect as a low metric value (i.e., below B-1 or B-2). However, this may not reflect 
a variable such as the assigned resupply ship being on-station and waiting for the 
opportunity to conduct the resupply. In such a case, the Commander could 
subjectively override the BGMCRS to reflect his personal assessment of the actual 
situation (reflect a higher B-rating than the performance algorithm would calculate 
at a given moment in time). However, the BGMCRS performance display software 
architecture was developed to annotate this subjective override with the accompany-
ing CVBG Commander's reason for override filed in the reason code section of the 
BGMCRS daily report. The archived data file would still maintain the raw data input 
along with the Commander's override and his comments. 
Figure 6 illustrates how a working group developed one such perform-
ance algorithm, in this case for CVBG critical task number three, Air Superiority. 
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Task3 
Ability to maintain 






Capability to detect, monitor, and maintain 
readiness to intercept aerial contacts 
+ 
Capability to establish and enforce No-fly 
Zones or conduct defensive counter-air 
operations in a littoral environment 
supported by organic tanking as necessary. 
+ 
3c. Capability to detect and defeat a 
coordinated, multi-axis attack by advanced 
cruise missiles. 
Source: From CINCLANTFLT, 1996, p. B-1. 
Figure 6. Air Superiority Task Performance Algorithm 
Each performance algorithm was further refmed in a multi-phase review process with 
CINCLANTFL T and the GWBG Commander providing final approval. 
Sub-task B-rating values were determined through the development of 
a matrix table for each sub-task performance indicator. For example, critical 
performance indicators selected for Sub-task 3a were: 
Percentage of 3-D Air Search Radars inoperative. 
Percentage of Ship Electronic Intercept Receivers inoperative. 
CVW Fixed Wing Aircraft Mission Capable (MC) Rates. 
CVW Fixed Wing Aircraft Mission Completion Rates. 
Tactical Receive Application (TRAP) Operational Availability. 
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Data Link 11 Effectiveness. 
Percent of Air Unknown Contacts Within the Inner Defense Zone 
(IDZ). 
Figure 7 displays the B-rating matrix for sub-task 3a indicators. Each 
sub-task had a matrix table developed which when numerically aggregated would 
result in a B-rating for that given sub-task. Each resulting sub-task B-rating would 
SIDPES AIRCRAFT 
3D RADAR SYSTEM MCRATES 
B-Rating CASREPs C'ASREPs VAW VFIVFA VAQNQ 
0°/o 0°/o 911% 90°/o 90% 
2 10% 10% 83% 83% 84% 
3 20% 20% 75% 75% 77% 
4 30% 30% 70% 70% 72% 
5 >311°/o >311% <711% <711°/o <72°/o 
AlR SUPERIORITY 
Sub-task '3a' Matrix 
MISSION COMPLETION UNK •/o 
RATES TRAP EFFEC'- AIR 
VAW VFIVFA VAQIVQ Ao TIVE"-"ESS UNK 
96°/o 96°/o 96°/o 95% 95% 11°/o 
92% 92% 92% 911% 911% 111% 
88% 88% 88% 85% 85% 20% 
84°/o 84% 84% 80% 80% 311% 
<84% <84% <84•/o <80% <80% >30°/o 
Source: From CINCLANTFLT briefing to GAO representatives 26 August, 1996. 
Figure 7. B-Rating Matrix for Air Superiority Sub-Task 3a 
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then be averaged to derive the final B-rating for a given critical task. The fmal 
performance algorithm for critical task number 3 is then: 
Output Capability = 
Critical Task # 3 
Average of sub-tasks 
3a + 3b + 3c B-ratings 
3. Creating a Data Collection and Array System 
The initial version of the BGMCRS included 120 performance indicators and 
750 discrete data elements. The version that the GWBG deployed with included 280 
performance indicators (some appear more than once in different aggregations) and 
1050 discrete data elements. "The pilot plan development involved creating a process 
to collect, correlate and analyze desired data. ·The need for a CVBG level readiness 
reporting system became obvious." (CINCLANTFLT, 1995, p. 19) This was 
accomplished using a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) computer spreadsheet 
program. The specific brand is of no consequence, the major ones such as Lotus or 
Excel all possess the same relative capabilities. What is important to realize is how 
the common desktop computer provided CINCLANTFLT with the ability to create and 
manipulate the complex data base that supported the BGMCRS. 
The COTS spreadsheet system would become the heart of a concurrent 
initiative during the PPRP, the creation and testing of the prototype BGMCRS which 
supported CINCLANTFLT's performance plan and assessing the ability to measure 
the performance of a CVBG. The BGMCRS allowed for the collection and array of 
data, inclusion of metrics and controls in the aggregation of data and the subsequent 
display of the resulting output capability for each measured critical task. The COTS 
spreadsheet also allowed the flexibility to adapt and adjust to the needs of the GWBG 
Commander as the GWBG's experience level increased as it conducted the trials of 
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the performance assessment process and developed the performance reports generated 
by the BGMCRS. 
Figures 8, 9 and 10 provide examples of how a BGMCRS daily report may be 
presented. The BGMCRS was normally presented as a visual report but could be 
provided in printed form. Starting with Figure 8, the BGMCRS would provide the 
Battle Group Commander a one slide or one page visual snap-shot of the CVBG's 
daily performance for each of the measured critical tasks. In a later version, as was 
shown in Figure 2, the historical average is also displayed. In the case of Air 
Superiority, Figure 8, there is a dot next to the generated B-rating ( B-2) that indicates 
a buried degrader. The Battle Group Commander could ask to see the Air Superiority 
Display screen/report to discern which of the Air Superiority sub-tasks was below B-
2. Figure 9 provides an example of this information. In.this example, Sub-task A 
also reflects a buried degrader and the Commander may wish to view the sub-task 
display screen to discern what was causing the degradation of the sub-task value. In 
viewing the Sub-task A display screen/report, Figure 10, the Commander could 
quickly see that the Link Effectiveness rating is a B-5. By proceeding through three 
layers of the BGMCRS display/report, the Commander now knows which buried 
degrader was impacting on the overall B-rating for Air Superiority. At this point the 
Commander can make a management decision as to what action may or may not need 
to be taken. Where the BGCDR would previously have to mentally "compute" the 
performance assessment for Air Superiority, the BGMCRS now automatically 
accomplishes this for him and at a greater level of aggregation than previously 
possible. 
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Battle Group Reporting System 
Readiness Status as of 15 Dec 95 
Air Superiority •82 (1.59) 
Maritime Superiority •82 (1.85) 
Power Projection 81 (0.81) 
Peacetime Presence 82 (1.25) 
Sustainment •82 (1.75) 
Command & Control 81 (0.47) 
Surveillance & Intel •82 (1.64) 
Source: From CINCLANTFL T N8 Briefing on the BGMCRS, 1995. 
Figure 8. BGMCRS Sample Complete Critical Task Report/Display Screen 
Air Superiority 15 Dec 95 
Seize and Maintain Contol of Designated Airspace 
A Detect, Monitor & Intercept Air •82 (1.90) 
Contacts 
I I Is Establish & Enforce No-Fly Zones •82 (1.63) 
I I lc Detect/Defeat Coord Mulit-Axis ASM 82 (1.24) 
Attack 
Source: From CINCLANTFLTN8 Briefing on the BGMCRS, 1995. 
Figure 9. BGMCRS Sample Critical Task Report/Display Screen 
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Air Superiority - Subtask A 15 Dec 95 
Detect, Monitor and Intercept Aerial Contacts 
% 3D Radar CASREPS 81 (1.00) 0.00% 
% Ship ES Sys C3/C4 81 (1.00) 0.00% 
Acft Msn Capable Rates 82 (1.71) 85.05% 
Air Msn Completion Rates 82 (1.52) 93.90% 
TRAP Op Avail (Ao) 82 (1.67) 91.67% 
I LINK Effectiveness 85 (4.51) 38.90% 
rn % Air Unknows in IDZ 
Source: From CINCLANTFLT N8 Briefing on the BGMCRS, 1995. 
Figure 10. BGMCRS Sample Subtask Report/Display Screen 
4. Establishing Performance Goals 
Because of the prototype nature of the BGMCRS and this being 
CINCLANTFLT's first attempt as a PPRP, the determination of an overall 
performance goal for the GWBG was a concern for all involved .. "Recognizing the 
limitations of normal peacetime operations and the resource constraints that 
Commander, George Washington Battle Group can expect to face on deployment, 
CINCLANTFLT has set the performance goal ofB-2 overall and B-2 for each of the 
critical tasks selected for this pilot project." (CINCLANTFLT, 1995, p. A-2) 
G. SUMMARY 
The primary purpose ofCINCLANTFL T's implementation plan was to support 
the day-to-day tactical information needs of the GWBG Commander and his staff 
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while providing aggregate performance information to higher headquarters. 
CINCLANTFL T created a performance measurement process by leveraging existing 
readiness assessment systems and keeping the process simple ahd bounded. The 
process of executing the PPRP and developing the BGMCRS cost CINCLANTFL T 
approximately $131,000 (Pearsall, 1996). The approximate cost of a deployed CVBG 
being $133 million (CINCLANTFLT, 1994). This means for less than one tenth of 
one percent, CINCLANTFL T created a system for measuring the performance of a 
CVBG. By any measure, this must be considered an exceptional return on their 
investment. Use of an COTS software spreadsheet system allowed them to collect, 
correlate and manipulate collected data into a useful information report for the 
GWBG Commander. 
The evolution of the PPRP changed from the GWBG conducting a non-routine, 
added tasking of potentially limited near term utility to validating a prototype Battle 
Group readiness system (BGMCRS) of potentially unlimited utility. In doing so, 
CINCLANTFLT was able to develop, capture, and finalize performance measures 
that reflected the micro-level performance information for use by the BGCDR and 
his staff while providing macro-level performance information for use by 
CINCLANTFLT. 
Using COTS software CINCLANTFLT developed a cost effective way to 
collect data and integrate that data to produce performance indicators that reflected 
corporate knowledge ofhow a CVBG accomplishes its many varied tasks. "If nothing 
else, it confirms that a little bit of waterfront sailor common sense goes a long way." 
(Pearsall, 1996) 
In Chapter IV an exploration of the strengths and weaknesses of 
CINCLANTFL T's performance measurement process will be conducted. Current or 
future performance management initiatives at CINCLANTFL Twill also be discussed. 
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IV. EVALUATION OF CINCLANTFLT'S PPRP 
A. INTRODUCTION 
"OMB's GPRA analyst has characterized the CINCLANTFLT performance 
measurement model as one of the best of the 71 GPRA pilots" (CINCLANTFLT, 
1996, p. 1) and also characterized CINCLANTFL T's performance plan as being of 
exemplar quality (OMB, 1995b ). The George Washington Battle Group Commander, 
Rear Admiral Giffin, states that CINCLANTFL T's performance measurement pilot 
project has demonstrated the capability exists to measure the readiness of a carrier 
battle group (CDR, GWBG, 1996) and has recommended that the Battle Group 
Mission Capability Reporting System (BGMCRS) be placed onboard each of 
CINCLANTFL T's carrier battle groups (Pearsall, 1996). 
The ability to conduct performance management is hinged on management's 
ability to measure performance. CINCLANTFL T's pilot created the BGMCRS to 
measure the performance of a carrier battle group. CINCLANTFLT's execution of 
the pilot and the creation of the BGMCRS were done in order to support 
CINCLANTFL T's strategic management goal of developing a process of accurate and 
timely measures of performance. 
Some observers see CINCLANTFL T's performance assessment process as a 
model for performance management and possibly for strategic planning. Some 
observers point to the development of CINCLANTFL T's performance assessment 
model as the result ofCINCLANTFLT's "plan to plan" (Bryson, 1995) which set the 
stage for CINCLANTFL T accomplishing an effective performance assessment 
process and implementing performance management principles within the manage-
ment/leadership culture of a carrier battle group. 
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Why CINCLANTFL T's pilot has received such praise and approval will be 
illustrated through a discussion of the strengths of its performance management 
process. The weaknesses of CINCLANTFL T's performance management process 
will also be addressed to demonstrate what efforts remain to be accomplished in 
order to continue the process of implementing performance management within 
CINCLANTFL T. 
As is the case in many new initiatives, those involved in the execution of the 
PPRP will be able to identify many of the strengths and weakness of that system 
(Wolfgang, 1995). Evaluation of CINCLANTFL T's PPRP will be accomplished 
primarily through a exploration of the CDR, GWBG's executive summary and 
program recommendations made concerning the GWBG's execution of the pilot 
project. Information received through interviews with members of the GWBG staff 
will also provide additional perspective of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
process. 
The final section of this chapter will be a discussion of current or future 
initiatives at CINCLANTFLT as a result of participating as a PPRP. If the primary 
indication of an effective pilot project is what an organization plans to do at the 
conclusion of its GPRA PPRP, then these future initiatives should provide some 
indication of how successful CINCLANTFL T has been in instituting performance 
management principles within its organization. 
B. PPRP STRENGTHS 
"The PPRP has demonstrated the capability exists to measure the readiness of 
a CVBG. This pilot program has established a methodology for measuring a CVBG's 
combat readiness." (CDR, GWBG, 1996, Enclosure 1, p. 1). The GWBG 
Commander's statement demonstrates a credible level of "customer" satisfaction and 
illustrates that measurement of a combatant force's outcome(s) is possible. The 
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Commander of the GWBG made several key points in his Executive Summary 
concerning the PPRP and his attendant validation of the BGMCRS (contained in his 
final report to CINCLANTFL T). These key points will be brokeh into two general 
areas: 
The power of the BGMCRS. 
Effectiveness ofPPRP methodology. 
1. The Power of the BGMCRS 
The power of the BGMCRS results in a vast improvement in the management 
information previously available to the BGCDR. It allows "middle managers" to 
review performance at the micro-level, "corporate and executive managers" (i.e., 
BGCDR and senior staff officers) to review performance at either the micro-level or 
macro-level for the entire carrier battle group. It also provides CINCLANTFL T with 
an in-depth archived data set (the first time this has been possible) that documents the 
day-to-day and macro-level performance that covers the entire period an operationally 
CVBG was deployed. Several of the key attributes of the BGMCRS include:· 
Multi-level data relationship displays 
Raw, computed, modified data separately archived 
Trend analysis, over selectable time frame 
Command Override notation provided 
Buried degradation visual cue 
Performance degradation linked to reason code 
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Data cells annotated as to degradation cause 
Engine 'tuneable' to any set of performance measurc;:s 
Source: CINCLANTFL T briefing to GAO representatives, 26 August, 1996. 
The attributes, capabilities and products available from the BGMCRS were 
discussed in Chapter III. The system allowed the CDR, GWBG and his principle staff 
to focus on managing for results through quantifying performance output capability 
for key performance indicators that reflected a carrier battle group's ability to 
accomplish its critical tasks. The key points of what the BGMCRS provided the 
CDR, GWBG and his principle staff were the abilities to: 
Assess readiness [projected output capability] in both warfighting and 
support areas. 
Review the trend in any task, sub-task, or specific metric to the average 
values over any given time period. 
Use the BGMCRS information in a tactical application. 
Provide the Fleet Commanders an assessment of the readiness of the 
CVBG to execute all of its missions. 
(CDR, GWBG, 1996) 
a. Assess Readiness 
"During the pilot program, the BGCDR and his principle staff assistants 
were able to assess the Battle Group's warfighting capabilities in defined mission 
areas by monitoring the data which documents the most current capabilities of the 
various ships, aircraft, submarines and support vessels assigned to the BG." (CDR, 
GWBG, 1996, Enclosure 1, p. 1) Simply stated, the members of the GWBG had the 
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ability, due to the existence of the BGMCRS, to achieve a holistic appraisal of the 
capabilities of the CVBG. 
"' 
"The benefits to the BGCDR and his principle assistants can be 
significant." (CDR, GWBG, 1996, Enclosure 1, p. 3) The BGMCRS allowed for the 
streamlining of data (CDR, GWBG, 1996), manipulation, correlation and display of 
information either daily, weekly, or monthly. The archive capability of the system 
allowed for storage of data and information that was not possible prior to the 
development of the BGMCRS. In short, the BGMCRS was a management tool the 
CVBG staff did not previously have which now allowed for improved, efficient and 
effective, management of the CVBG. 
b. Review Trends 
The BGMCRS allowed the GWBG to utilize the power of the computer 
spreadsheet to chart individual performance indicators. Prior to a performance 
indicator degrading, the GWBG staff was able to anticipate potential performance 
indicator values. The BGMCRS spreadsheet software structure eliminated the need 
for human labor to accomplish the laborious task of aggregating large amounts of 
data. What was not previously possible, now was due to the common desktop 
computer. This enabled the BGCDR and his staff to focus on those "critical few" 
elements that could adversely impact on the GWBG's ability to perform a given 
critical task. Instead of having a reactive management approach they were now able 
to become proactive in their management of the GWBG's performance capability 
(GWBG staff, 1996). 
c. Tactical Application 
"The summary of data can provide insight into the allocation of scarce 
assets to competing mission areas, thus maximizing warfighting capabilities across 
all disciplines." (CDR, GWBG, Enclosure 1, p. 3) By quantifying and measuring 
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critical task/sub-task performance indicators the CDR, GWBG now had the ability to 
effect reallocation of resources through quantitative analysis rather than qualitative 
"guesses." 
d. Overall Assessment of CVBG's Ability 
The GWBG was able to use the aggregate of the seven critical tasks as 
a surrogate indicator of the overall capability of the GWBG for all thirteen critical 
tasks (CDR, GWBG, 1996). Many of the performance indicators presently being 
measured for the pilot would have also been incorporated in the remaining six critical 
tasks which did not have performance algorithms developed (Pearsall, 1996). "The 
metrics developed maintain a top level picture of the [CVBG] capability while still 
retaining necessary sensitivity to particular operations." (CDR, GWBG, 1996, 
Enclosure 1, p. 2). 
2. Effectiveness of PPRP Methodology 
"The basic principles used in the CVBG GPRA pilot program can b~ used to 
assess the readiness [outcome] of any unit, group ofunits, or facility desired. (CDR, 
GWGB, 1996, Enclosure 1, p. 1) Organizations that are considered "leaders" in 
accomplishing management reform have consistently utilized three critical steps in 
the development of their performance management process: (1) Define organizational 
mission and goals [outcomes], (2) Measure performance, and (3) Use the performance 
information (GAO, 1996). Chapter III illustrated how CINCLANTFL T and its action 
agent, the GWBG accomplished each of these three steps. What is important to 
appreciate is the management style that CINCLANTFL T and the GWBG utilized to 
accomplish these three steps. 
a. Existing Leadership/Management Culture 
CINCLANTFL T N8's coordination process and Rear Admiral Giffin's 
management style of the PPRP are founded in the concepts, tenants and practjces 
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found in the Navy's Total Quality Leadership (TQL) program. TQL as a discipline 
in the Navy began in 1983 (DoN, TQLO, 1992). A manifestation of the level in 
·' 
which TQL is affecting Navy leadership can be seen by the management style utilized 
by CINCLANTFLT to execute its PPRP. TQL's emphasis is on process improvement 
through employee empowerment (CINCLANTFLT, 1993) and use of quantitative 
measurement systems and practices (DoN, TQLO, 1992). 
One of the manifestations of TQL in CINCLANTFL T's pilot was the 
use of the deliberative management approach in the conduct of the pilot project. The 
phrase deliberative management may seem foreign to a military officer. After all, 
most combatant officers do not characterize themselves as managers - they consider 
themselves leaders and warfighters. It is the rare combatant officer who would 
characterize himself solely as a manager. Proponents of TQL would describe 
deliberative management as another way of characterizing effective leadership. The 
deliberative approach lists four design elements that are important parts to effective 
deliberation: (1) Determination of a strategic question; (2) Encouraging stakeholder 
collaboration; (3) Generative learning - moving participants beyond their old "givens" 
and assumptions to find new solutions and opportunities for action; and ( 4) Executive 
action (Roberts, 1996). 
"Can we measure performance of a combatant unit and, if so, how?" 
was how CINCLANTFLT framed their strategic question. 
Next external stakeholder collaboration was demonstrated by the 
issuance of OPNAV Instruction 3501.316 that established CVBG critical tasks. 
Although not explicitly demonstrated, issuance of this instruction involved internal 
Navy stakeholders such as the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Commands, TYCOMS and 
external stakeholders such as the Warfighting CINCS and DoD. Communication 
among these stakeholders resulted in the consensus of what is expected of a CVBG. 
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CINCLANTFL T's internal stakeholders were then given the task of 
determing the appropriate performance metrics that demonstrated accomplishment of 
the critical CVBG tasks. N8 garnered internal stakeholder collaboration by 
challenging the GWBG and working groups to develop a management information 
system that supported the BGCDR as its primary purpose, while providing specific 
performance information for staff officer use and aggregate performance information 
to CINCLANTFLT. 
Generative learning occurred through the development of the BGMCRS 
and performance algorithms as individuals began to see how creating a function based 
measurement system crossed and interrelated their respective areas of responsibility. 
The working groups were able to go beyond common expectations of what is 
important to them, to thinking in terms of the information needs of the BGCDR and 
CINCLANTFLT. 
Executive action relates to the fact that the CINCLANTFL T N8 and the 
GWBG Commander made the ultimate decision on the content of the performance 
plan, performance metrics and performance goals. TQL and deliberative management 
do not mean relinquishing control or responsibility for an organization. They simply 
allow for greater employee involvement in solving organization challenges. 
CINCLANTFLT or the CDR, GWBG may characterize the execution 
of the pilot project as the result of good leadership. In business terms their actions 
would be characterized as effective management. 
We have a powerful tool in TQL. We have a theory with which to 
access our process and our systems; we have the tools by which to 
measure our progress; and we have a mechanism by which to involve 
all of our people in the Navy to make things better. Let's put it to use 
in our day-to-day operations to ensure that we fight, we win. (Kelso, 
CNO, cited in DoN, TQLO, 1993) 
62 
N8's coordination and the CDR, GWBG management of the pilot 
project demonstrates that TQL is making inroads as a management process within 
~ 
... 
CINCLANTFLT. Just as the principles of TQL have taken time, energy and 
leadership support to bear fruit for the Navy, use of performance management 
principles will not occur overnight. "I doubt we could have accomplished the pilot 
ten years ago." (Pearsall, 1996) 
C. PPRP WEAKNESSES 
Interviews with several GWBG staff officers and recommendations made by 
the CDR, GWBG illuminate some of the weaknesses ofCINCLANTFL T's PPRP and 
provide some indication of future leadership efforts required within CINCLANTFL T 
if the performance management process is to continue. The principle weaknesses of 






1. Metric Creep 
Because the BGMCRS possesses such power and flexibility the potential for 
"metric creep" - adding more and more "vital few" metrics for measurement exists 
(Hill, 1996). As was previously discussed in Chapter III, the initial version of the 
BGMCRS accommodated 750 data elements and 120 performance indicators. The 
GWBG deployed with a system that collected 1050 data elements to derive 280 
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performance indicators for seven of the thirteen critical CVBG tasks. This final 
metrics package was the result of detailed analysis that reduced the original me tries 
set that was two to three times larger than the one ultimately finalized (GWBG, 
1996). 
Simple extrapolation of the present BGMCRS metrics set might result in a 
BGMCRS that includes as many as 520 performance indicators and 1950 data 
elements to support measurement of all thirteen critical tasks. Add to this the 
recommendation of the GWBG Commander to create the ability for the Battle Group 
Commander to add tailored metrics to each task or sub-task for monitoring (GWBG, 
1996) and the flexible BGMCRS may soon become too large and cumbersome to be 
effective. 
One of the first considerations an organization must decide upon when 
commencing development of its measurement system is what will constitute enough 
data. Each organization must determine its own point along the data collection 
continuum - between measuring everything (Trump, 1996) and measuring the vital 
few (Pearsall, 1996) - where enough information exists to satisfy management's 
needs. 
The initial BGMCRS data set was bounded by the constraints of time available 
and a focus on collecting information that primarily supported the BGCDR's tactical 
information needs. The challenge for CINCLANTFL T in the future will be to 
develop a management policy that, when implemented, keeps the data selection 
process responsive to the Commander's needs while inhibiting metric creep. 
"Configuration control of the BGMCRS will need to be forcefully managed." 
(Pearsall, 1996). The question of"value added" metrics must be addressed when any 
organization creates a performance measurement system (Hill and Pearsall, 1996). 
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2. Data Reliability 
With all computer applications, the adage "garbage in - garbage out" still 
remains relevant. This is more than a discussion of how to limit data input errors. A 
performance measurement system will only be as good as the people that provide the 
data. "Battle Group Commanders must instill in their personnel the absolute necessity 
for accuracy in data reporting. The observed variance in report discipline between 
ships, ship types, submarines and aircraft carriers, and fleets reduces the effectiveness 
of consistent data." (GWBG, 1996, Enclosure 2, p. 2). 
Several of the GWBG staff interviewed commented on the fact that Rear 
Admiral Giffin absolutely insisted on truthfulness of data reporting. Although they 
did not provide any specific instances, they suspected some units commanders of 
utilizing disparate values for BGMCRS purposes and other unit status reports (i.e., 
SORTS or CASREP) that required the same data. 
The CDR, GWBG was able to effect a paradigm shift for the purposes of the 
pilot project but it illustrates that there still exists a cultural paradigm that will require 
corporate leadership attention as the process of performance measurement matures 
and grows. 
Part of this tendency to report disparate data values can be overcome through 
the structure of the performance reporting system. The BGMCRS interrelated 
information into holistic, mission related performance indicators. This limited 
participant ability and tendency to "play the numbers." (Hill, 1996) However, 
modifying the system provides an answer, but not the solution, to the greater problem 
of failing to modify an organization's reward system to support the performance 
management process. 
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3. Organizational Culture 
Several GWBG Staff interviewees expressed concern about the perception of 
the potential use of the BGMCRS as an assessment system of a commander's 
leadership skills. Each stressed that if the BGMCRS follows the same direction as 
SORTS and CASREP, which are seen as "report cards" by their TYCOMS, then the 
performance management process will fail. 
One of the reasons this is problematic for a combatant force is the fact that the 
military's reward system is fixed. The only way a manager (either officer or enlisted) 
is rewarded is by being promoted. With the reward system in the military fixed, there 
will always be potential inducement to report "what the commander wants to hear" 
(only positive performance indicators) especially if it ultimately relates to the future 
promotion of, or decision to retain in the case of enlisted personnel, a military 
member. 
Strong leadership from top managers/leaders that emphasizes and values 
accurate reporting for management purposes is essential. A balance between the 
paradox of needing performance information to effect management decisions and 
limiting (or excluding) the use of that performance information as a determinant of 
a manager's/leader's value is required if the performance management process is to 
remain viable. 
4. Management/Leadership Culture 
Just as the BGMCRS provided greater quantitative data for the BGCDR's use, 
it also created greater complexity for his principle staff Senior staff officers (Navy 
Captains and Commanders) reveled in the impact the BGMCRS had in increasing 
their ability to effectively and efficiently manage their respective areas. Several 
junior officers (Lieutenant Commanders and Lieutenants) were initially awestruck as 
their "universes" expanded. Several of these junior staff members interviewed related 
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how they watched as an occasional principle staff officer, several junior staff officer, 
or they themselves, initially had trouble effecting the change in their management 
style. 
Switching from a management style that focused only on task specific areas, 
to one that required incorporating a greater cross-functional management style did 
not occur overnight. This strain manifested itself in the moderate support several of 
the junior GWBG staff gave the BGMCRS during their interviews (One officer 
simply characterized the BGMCRS as "O.K."). More information does not always 
equate to decreased work load or in assisting a manager to effectively accomplishing 
his job. 
Not only will CINCLANTFLT need to standardize training in the use of the 
BGMCRS, they will also need to incorporate principle staff training to facilitate 
effective use of the BGMCRS (CDR, GWBG, 1996). These "middle managers" will 
need to be educated on how to prevent the performance assessment process from 
taking over the· direction of their day-to-day efforts (e.g., thinking that data collection 
and analysis is their primary role) while learning how to make the performance 
assessment system assist them in the better management of their responsible areas. 
Another effect resulting from the GWBG's validation of the BGMCRS was the 
realization of the effort required by affected parties to integrate their respective 
responsibilities. This is the essence of effective staff work, which can sometimes get 
"lost" in the day-to-day execution of one's job. Through the iterative process of 
determining performance algorithms and validating the BGMCRS, unit commanders 
and staff officers soon found that attempting to sub-optimize in one area could 
adversely impact on an aggregate task output capability value. Instead of being able 
to focus on simply managing their "distinct activities," managers found their jobs 
taking on greater complexity as a result of the BGMCRS. A frustration expressed by 
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severaljunior staff officers was the desire to know "Who is responsible for something 
that affects more than one mission area?" Another comment was: ui can only juggle 
so many balls at one time." 
This complexity was a by-product of the requirement to now know and 
anticipate how their actions would reflect on the aggregate performance of the whole 
Battle Group. They found themselves operating as integrated functional managers 
which requires more energy, effort, training and education. 
This should not be considered a "bad" result of the performance management 
system, it just illustrates one of its by-products. The benefits the BGMCRS provides 
to the BGCDR and his staff come at a cost of greater management complexity for all 
involved, especially in the lower levels of the managerial hierarchy. "An effective 
management information system is usually expensive and time consuming to develop, 
but without it, an organization is unable to assess - relatively objectively and 
unambiguously - its strengths weaknesses, efficiency and effectiveness." (Bryson, 
1995,p. 85) 
Assuming that there will be no additional resources given in terms of increased 
staff sizes, management/leadership education in the proper execution of the 
performance management process and the performance measurement system for 
combatant commanders and their staffs will be critical. Clarification of job 
descriptions, responsibilities and authority also need to be assessed as an organization 
embraces performance measurement and performance management principles. 
5. BGMCRS Limitations 
Several GWBG Staff Officers interviewed expressed the concern that "outside" 
personnel or organizations will see the BGMCRS as a way to justify modification of 
unit resources (budget). They also fear a "bean counter" suggesting modifying B-
rating goals to effect monetary savings. 
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Several interviewees commented on the need to educate "outsiders" of the fact 
that the BGMCRS is not refined enough to effect resource decisions. One interviewee 
stated it so: "The BGMCRS only reports performance. It was not designed to model 
performance or derive the costs of that measured performance." Due partially to the 
prototype nature and purpose of the BGMCRS, at this stage, it should not be 
considered a tool by which to model CVBG readiness or effect resource allocation 
decisions. The BGMCRS is not, and was not, designed to capture all variables that 
effect the potential output capability of a CVBG. 
Until further validation of the BGMCRS is accomplished and the system is 
refined it would be inappropriate to consider it a resource allocation tool for either 
micro-level or macro-level adjustments of resources. 
Figure 11 illustrates this concept. On the horizontal axis is the cost of a six 
month deployed CVBG. The average CVBG cost while deployed is approximately 
$133 million. Along the vertical axis is the B-rating scale. The resulting B-rating of 
B-2 achieved by the GWBG and the approximate cost of the GWGB's deployment 
result in only one data point on the graph. 
B-1 ? ? 
') 
B-2 X ? 
GWBG 
B-rating B-3 ') 
B-..1- ') 
B-5 
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 ($M) 
RESOURCE COSTS WHILE DEPLOYED 
Figure 11. Resources Versus B-Rating Graph 
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Even with the data collected by the GWBG, an adjustment of either resources 
or established B-rating level goal may not reflect in a different data point. How much 
would it take to move the needle? Could a one percent change in resources ($1.3 
million) result in a change in overall B-rating? Would a few thousand dollars used 
to adjust a performance indicator reflect in a differing sub-task value that would 
change the overall critical task B-rating? (Franceski, 1996) 
After another CVBG's deployment performance data is collected 
CINCLANTFL T will be able to connect these aggregate data points. At that point in 
time CINCLANTFL T will have a rudimentary relationship between resources 
expended and B-ratings. At this point it may be possible to effect macro-level 
adjustments. 
When it comes to the ability of a CVBG to support a W arfighting CINC, 
should a BGCDR err towards costs savings at the expense of a potentially degraded 
critical task output capability? This question and those mentioned previously are not 
trivial when it pertains to matters of national security. Answers to these questions 
should take time, serious study and careful determination of who should have the 
ability and responsibility to make these decisions prior to any quick action. 
D. FUTURE INITIATIVES AT CINCLANTFLT 
If the PPRP was a success at CINCLANTFLT, then the performance manage-
ment process should have a continuing life. At CINCLANTFL T and other DoD pilot 
organizations I talked to while conducting research for this thesis, two recurring 
trends continually came to the forefront. First, the performance management 
processes desired by GPRA were already underway prior to executing their PPRPs. 
Second, the management processes utilized, refined and developed during their 
PPRPs are not ending with the conclusion of their FY 1996 PPRPs (with the issuance 
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of their 1996 performance reports in March, 1997). The same can be said for 
CINCLANTFLT. 
Several initiatives are underway as CINCLANTFL T' s FY 1996 pilot comes 
to its formal conclusion with the delivery of its performance report in March, 1997. 
A refined BGMCRS (incorporating recommended changes derived from the GWBG's 
initial validation) will be utilized by the Theodore Roosevelt Battle Group (TRBG) 
when it deploys in November, 1996. The TRBG will measure the same seven critical 
CVBG tasks that were measured by the GWBG. 
Upon the TRBG's return from deployment, CINCLANTFL T will begin the 
data analysis afforded by having two aggregate sets of CVBG performance. If the 
CDR, TRBG favorably endorses the BGMCRS, CINCLANTFLT plans to finalize the 
system and place it on board every CINCLANTFL T carrier battle group. 
Another initiative underway at N8 is the development of an Amphibious Ready 
Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (ARG/MEU (SOC)) 
mission capability reporting system. The Chief ofNaval Operations has just recently 
approved the ARGIMEU(SOC) critical tasks list and the ARG/MEU(SOC) policy 
instruction is pending. N8 intends to begin the task of developing ARG/MEU(SOC) 
performance algorithms. At some point the major organizational units of the 
ARGIMEU(SOC) will become involved in the collaborative effort of developing the 
initial ARG/MEU(SOC) performance algorithms and a prototype ARG/MEU (SOC) 
Mission Capability Reporting System. 
When the GWBG makes its next operational deployment overseas it will take 
with it not only a standardized BGMCRS, but it will also test and validate an 
integrated Battle Group Cost/Performance data base. This data base will integrate 
BGMCRS performance data with related Operations and Maintenance, Navy 




product line." This effort will be a joint CINCLANTFL T, CNO, and Comptroller of 
the Navy initiative to operate the CVBG as a Performance Based Organization (PBO) 
with selective resource control allocated to the Battle Group Commander for the 
conduct of the operation. An end goal of this initiative is to develop a performance 
based managerial accounting system (Pearsall, 1996). 
E. SUMMARY 
The strengths of CINCLANTFLT's PPRP lie in the management process 
utilized in the execution of the pilot which allowed for involvement of all concerned 
participants in the development of the CVBG critical task and sub-task performance 
indicators and B-rating matrices that became the structure within the BGMCRS. The 
performance plan remained manageable and the leadership/management style of the 
GWBG's Commander, Rear Admiral Giffin ensured that command attention and 
support for the pilot program ensured it remained more than just a additional tasking 
to accomplish. 
The weaknesses of CINCLANTFL T's PPRP are grounded in the need to 
continue changing organizational cultures and the need for management/leadership 
education to effectively transition to a performance management/leadership style. 
What started as a process to answer the "GPRA mail" has resulted in a new and 
evolving management process in CINCLANTFLT. "I think we [CINCLANTFLT] 
will drive to linking the budget to performance. Whether or not GPRA results in any 
impact at our level doesn't matter because we will continue the process because it 
makes sense." (Whiteway, 1996) 
What will be discussed in the next and last chapter will be CINCLANTFL T's 
lessons learned from coordinating and executing its pilot project, recommended areas 
for further study and thesis conclusions. 
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V. LESSONS LEARNED, RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUMMARY 
A. OVERVIEW 
The primary purpose of this thesis was to explore the process the Commander 
in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) used to accomplish its pilot project 
in performance measurement. The structure of GPRA pilot project requirements also 
resulted in CINCLANTFL T accomplishing performance planning and will result in 
a performance report by March, 1997. 
CINCLANTFL T's, action agent the George Washington Battle Group was able 
to validate that the performance of a carrier battle group could be quantitatively 
measured. Through the execution of the pilot project a Battle Group Mission 
Capability Reporting System was created. This system was able to automate the 
Battle Group Commander's management information system and provide him and his 
staff with both micro-level and micro-level performance information. The system 
also provided CINCLANTFL T with the aggregate macro-level performance measure-
ment of a carrier battle group and a first time ever archived data set that documents 
the day-to-day performance of a carrier battle group deployed for six months. 
Chapter II discussed the requirements and intent of GPRA. The concept of 
performance measurement was also discussed. GPRA pilot projects requirements and 
specific documentation on the requirements for performance measurement pilots was 
provided. This established the requirements for, and expected results from, 
performance measurement pilots. 
Chapter III documented how CINCLANTFL T accomplished its performance 
measurement pilot. CINCLANTFLT accomplished its pilot by assigning the project 
to the right people, utilized the tenants of Total Quality Leadership and deliberative 
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management, leveraged existing performance measurement systems to create a better 
way to quantitatively measure a carrier battle group's performance. 
By focusing on the performance information needs of the Battle Group 
Commander, having the process bounded by time and available resources and 
utilizing a commercial off-the-shelf computer spreadsheet CINCLANTFL T was able 
to efficiently and effectively develop a system that measured the performance of a 
carrier battle group. The resulting system enabled the Battle Group Commander to 
automate his primary management information. 
Many combatant organizations will find that they are already conducting some 
sort of performance measurement, but probably not at an aggregated organizational 
level. Utilizing the process created by CINCLANTFL T, combatant organizations 
have a framework for improving their own leadership/management processes and 
systems. 
Chapter IV evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of the CINCLANTFL T 
performance assessment process. The key strength in CINCLANTFL T's performance 
assessment process was the George Washington Battle Group Commander's favorable 
endorsement for the Mission Capability Reporting System and the performance 
management process. The deliberative management process allowed "middle 
management" to produce a bottom-up solution to CINCLANTFL T's top-down 
challenge of determining whether or not performance of a CVBG could be measured, 
and if so how. 
Weaknesses of the pilot project process point to the continued need for top 
leadership/management support to continue the cultural paradigm shifts required to 
effect performance management within a combatant organization. 
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B. CINCLANTFLT LESSONS LEARNED 
An element of the Navy's TQL program is the process called the "Plan-Do-
Check-Act" (PDCA) cycle. CINCLANTFLT Warfare Requirements and Programs 
Directorate (N8) developed the initial pilot project plan. The pilot project was 
executed (do) by the GWBG and supported by N8. CINCLANTFLT has already 
conducted an initial evaluation of their performance assessment process and the 
BGMCRS (check). CINCLANTFL T has made modifications to the BGMCRS and 
will have the TRBG test the refined system. Having the TRBG test the refined 
BGMCRS and other initiatives mentioned in Chapter IV are part ofCINCLANTFL T's 
continued implementation of performance management within CINCLANTFLT (act). 
Figure 12 lists CINCLANTFL T's primary lessons learned from conducting its 
pilot project in performance measurement. Discussion of these lessons learned will 
follow. 
-Paradigm shifts can be palatable 
-User buy-in important 
- Process can be applied to any tasking 
- Dedicated investment to develop metrics 
- Avoid over complicating process - KISS 
Source: After CINCLANTFLT briefing to GAO representatives 26 August, 1996. 
Figure 12. CINCLANTFLT Lessons Learned 
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1. Palatable Paradigm Shifts and User By-in Important 
"A lot of what was accomplished is due to how the project was packaged." 
(Pearsall, 1996). The creation of the BGMCRS changed the focus of the PPRP from 
fulfilling the pilot project requirements of GPRA into creating a management 
information system that provided the BGCDR with the ability to assess his 
command's projected output capability. 
For combatant forces, the need to assess mission capability is an overriding 
concern. Development of the BGMCRS provided the psychological hook that 
ensured "middle management" support for the PPRP project. "Accounting systems 
aren't as sexy as a weapon system." (Franceski, 1996). Through the development of 
the BGMCRS a group ofwarfighters, who would characterize themselves as leaders 
first and managers second, developed a :MIS system that supported their Commander, 
provided them with the ability to manage their respective responsible areas in a cross-
functional, collaborative management style, while providing CINCLANTFL T with 
performance information of the CVBG at a macro-level. 
One of CINCLANTFL T's primary outcomes from the pilot project was the 
development of the BGMCRS. The BGMCRS is a performance measurement system 
that serves a dual role as a readiness assessment system. The results from the system 
are the same, the latter characterization is just more palatable to a warfighter. 
2. Applying the Process to Any Tasking 
CINCLANTFL T's performance assessment process model provides a road map 
to accomplishing results-oriented management. At its heart, just as in the key steps 
of GAO's GPRA implementation model, is the need to empower employees to 
determine the best way(s) to achieve clearly defined goals and objectives (GAO, 
1996). The creation of a responsive and effective performance measurement system 
is the key foundation that enables an organization to effect performance management 
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principles. CINCLANTFL T's pilot project demonstrates that any combatant 
organization can accomplish performance measurement and management, if they have 
the desire. 
3. Dedicated Investment to Develop Metrics 
Having the right people is the linchpin to the process. "Performance is the 
responsibility of functional managers, not comptrollers." (Hamre, 1994) 
CINCLANTFLT had their "managers" determine the performance indicators and 
structure of the BGMCRS. Specific support staff departments, such as accounting 
should be used to assist in the process, not drive or coordinate it. 
The cost in resources and time to develop appropriate metrics is not cheap. 
The benefits derived are worth the effort. Establishing limits of time available and 
purpose eliminate the potential for the metrics package from growing to large. 
CINCLANTFLT's approach was to create the "90%" solution (Pearsall, 1996). 
Realizing that not all variables could or should be captured in the performance 
assessment system CINCLANTFLT utilized process experts and key "managers" to 
determine the vital few variables necessary to determine performance outputs. 
CINCLANTFL T's performance measurement system allowed the BGCDR to interject 
common sense and his warfighting experience into the equation which prevented the 
performance measurement system from being unwieldy and unresponsive to the 
BGCDR's information needs. 
4. Avoid Over Complicating Process 
The question any organization desiring to accomplish performance manage-
ment must be ask is: When does the process provide enough information to satisfy 
the Commander's information needs? 
CINCLANTFLT made the decision to incrementally implement the perform-
ance management process within its organization. Taking "small steps" has enabled 
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CINCLANTFL T to enjoy "small successes" while it determines the most effective 
way to implement performance management principles throughout its organization. 
C. RECOMMENDED FUTURE RESEARCH AREAS 
CINCLANTFL T has begone an iterative and incremental process of instituting 
performance management principles throughout its organization. Since the process 
is relatively new, and GPRA's final impact on how Federal agencies will manage their 
operations is yet to be determined, they each offer several areas for future study. 
Some of these areas include: 
Comparison of the results of the TRBG's performance measurement 
process and that of the GWBG's. 
Exploration of the implementation and execution process for the 
prototype ARG Mission Capable Reporting System. 
Exploration of the process by which CINCLANTFL T integrates the 
prototype CVBG cost accounting system and the finalized BGMCRS 
and the resulting impact on the organizational performance manage-
ment process. 
Exploration of how DoD has implemented GPRA and the effect it has 
had on the current PPBS, individual services and major commands. 
A comparison between CINCLANTFL T' s incremental implementation 
of performance management principles and a DoD PPRP which insti-
tuted an agency-wide implementation of performance management 
would demonstrate the cost/benefits between the two varied approaches 
to implementing performance management principles. 
The first area of recommended research would provide additional lessons 
learned from a second testing and utilization of the BGMCRS. What would be 
interesting to note is whether or not there are standardized performance results 
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between the different carrier battle groups. Areas that could be researched could be 
what real-world variables impacted the TRBG's B-rating results as compared to those 
of the GWBG. A comparison of top leadership/management styles might illuminate 
how to effectively influence the performance measurement/management process. 
The second area of recommended research would document the challenges of 
integrating the performance measurement/management process of two different 
organizational cultures. Lessons learned would be of value to follow-on ARG/ 
MEU(SOC) organizations implementing the process. 
The third area of recommended research would illustrate the impact on, and 
challenges of, implementation on the organizational and managerial culture of a 
combatant force. A key question could be whether the performance assessment 
process would still be as viable after the integration of a cost accounting system. 
The fourth area for recommended research would document the impact GPRA 
and OUSD(C)'s implementation plan for GPRA compliance do or do not have on the 
day-to-day management of operations within the individual services and major 
commands. 
The last item for future research could help organizations just implementing 
performance management within their organization to determine the cost/benefits of 
either having an incremental implementation plan or organization-wide implementa-
tion plan. Figure 13 illustrates a potential finding of this research. The question is: 
Does either approach provide a more effective road map to successful implementation 
of performance management principles? This is not to say the represented "results 
curves" are accurate. It would be of value to know which approach avails an 










Figure 13. Possible Implementation Results Curves 
D. SUMMARY 
CINCLANTFL T demonstrated the capability exists to measure the perform-
ance of a combatant force, specifically a carrier battle group. CINCLANTFL T's 
performance assessment process entailed a deliberative management process born 
from the Navy's TQL program. "Middle managers" were given the challenge of 
determining the appropriate performance indicators and how those indicators were to 
be aggregated in the Battle Group Mission Capability Reporting System. 
Through CINCLANTFL T's performance assessment process a better way of 
measuring the performance capability of a CVBG was created. The new process 
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resulted in the collection of the "vital few" indicators that have the greatest impact on 
a CVBG's ability to accomplish a given critical task. 
GPRA's requirement for performance planning and reporting pilot projects 
served as the impetus for CINCLANTFLT to pursue one of the goals it had 
established in its 1994-1996 Strategic Plan, creating better metrics by which to 
measure and manage its core operations. 
The BGMCRS and CINCLANTFL T's performance management process will 
continue to undergo refinement and improvement. The challenge in the future will 
be taking the performance measurement/management process developed during the 
pilot project and turning it into an organization-wide process. In its GPRA implemen-
tation plan, GAO makes the following statement concerning the challenge of 
implementing the performance management ideals found within GPRA: 
A change of this magnitude will take time-- years rather than months --
and will occur only through the concerted efforts and commitment of 
Federal managers, agency officials, and other interested parties, 
including Congress. GAO, 1993, p. 5) 
The same common sense, patience and commitment that made 
CINCLANTFL T's performance measurement pilot project a success will be required 
if CINCLANTFL T wishes the performance management process to succeed over the 
long-term. The approach CINCLANTFLT took in order to accomplish its pilot 
project in performance measurement and the resulting performance management 
process can be used as the basis for modification by any combatant force that wishes 
to begin the process of performance management. 
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